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I Abstract 
 
The first part of this master thesis provides a comprehensive account of venture capital in the 
financial literature. Venture capital is explained in depth, the history of venture capital, the patterns 
of venture capital investments, the intricate workings of the highly specialized venture capital 
industry, the impact of venture capital on economic performance and innovation, and the 
government’s role in venture capital are all explained thoroughly.  
One thing that is evident from the Norwegian statistics on venture capital is that the ICT sector is, by 
far, the most important sector of venture capital in Norway, comprising almost a third of total 
venture capital investments in 2008 and 2009.  
The thesis goes on to present the results of an empirical study on the additionality of venture capital 
in relation to R&D, using data from the Statistics Norway (SSB). The hypothesis for the empirical 
analysis was that firms receiving venture capital and spending it on R&D have a tendency also to 
receive other types of external capital for R&D, i.e. there is an additionality effect greater than one 
related to venture capital. The results showed the opposite, that the additionality effect is less than 
one. Hence, venture capital appears to be crowding out other forms of financing for R&D. One 
interpretation of this is that as a firm receives venture capital and spends it on R&D it simultaneously 
removes some of the other forms of R&D financing. Another interpretation is simply that a weak 
construct validity and potential measurement errors bias the coefficients towards zero. The 
additionality effect was also found to be greater for smaller firms than bigger firms, which indicates 
that venture capital may be more important for smaller firms as a way to finance R&D and that 
smaller firms are therefore more capital constraint than bigger firms. More research is necessary to 
understand the exact mechanism of this additionality effect.  
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III Introduction 
 
Venture capital is a very interesting topic of study, as it can have a profound impact on the economy; 
providing capital constrained entrepreneurs with much needed capital and management expertise, 
thereby affecting the growth and structure of the entire economy. Venture capital is the link 
between clever entrepreneurs and their innovative products and commercial success. Many game 
changing firms started out as small entrepreneurial firms receiving venture capital, with Microsoft 
and Google being, perhaps, the most famous examples. Would they still have succeeded without the 
capital and management expertise provided by venture capital funds, or would they have 
disappeared and be forgotten like so many unsuccessful firms do every year?  
The venture capital industry has been studied quite thoroughly, and most researchers seem to agree 
that venture capital has a tendency to increase the growth and commercial success of firms, but a 
major unsolved issue still being debated in the financial literature is whether venture capital makes 
firms more innovative or simply that innovative firms are selected as recipients of venture capital. To 
answer this question in full is beyond the scope of this master thesis, but as it studies the 
additionality effect of venture capital on total R&D it does touch upon the subject.  
Having first provided a comprehensive account of venture capital in the financial literature, I will 
present the results of an empirical study on the relationship between venture capital and other types 
of external capital in relation to R&D financing. The hypothesis for the empirical study is that there is 
a tendency for firms who receive and use venture capital for R&D also to receive other types of 
external capital for R&D. The empirical study is, therefore, an attempt to identify the additionality 
effect of venture capital on total R&D spending. A Fixed Effects (FE) regression framework was used 
in an effort to control for most relevant influences on the outcome of the dependent variable, 
thereby trying to identify the counterfactual in order to identify the causal relationship between 
venture capital and total R&D.  
The paper is structured in three parts. The first part provides a brief description of venture capital 
and explains how venture capital is the free market solution to a market failure, presents the history 
of venture capital, and the patterns of venture capital investments, and there is also one chapter on 
the venture capital industry in Norway. The second part dives into the details of venture capital and 
presents many empirical findings from previous studies, thereby providing a greater understanding 
of the specialized nature of venture capital and the intricate workings of the venture capital industry. 
The third part is an empirical study on the additionality of venture capital on the financing of R&D 
using a panel dataset from the R&D survey performed by Statistics Norway (SSB).  
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Part 1: Introduction to Venture Capital 
 
1.0.0 The Private Equity Universe 
 
 
Figure 1 – Source: a modified version of Metrick’s 2007 figure 
Private equity is, broadly speaking, risk capital invested in firms that are not publicly traded on a 
stock exchange. The private equity universe can be broken down into the five categories seen in 
figure 1: (1) Angel Capital, (2) Venture capital, (3) Growth Capital, (4) Buyout Capital, and (5) Distress 
Capital; although other researchers have broken down private equity in other ways. In the following, 
I will explain the differences between the five types of capital in the private equity universe.  
(1) Angel Capital is equity provided by angel investors, or groups of angel investors, who are wealthy 
individuals investing their own capital. They usually provide capital to inventors and entrepreneurs, 
with nothing but an idea, who are looking to start up a firm (seed-stage) and to very young, start-up 
firms (start-up stage); stages that require only small amounts of capital. Consequently, Angel 
investors tend to make smaller, but a larger number of investments than for example venture capital 
funds. Since they invest their own capital, they can keep all the returns to their labor, and therefore 
have a correspondingly lower cost of capital compared to a financial intermediary, and can invest in 
deals that would not work for other types of private equity funds (Metrick 2007). According to 
Metrick (2007), total angel capital under management is estimated to be about the same size as total 
venture capital under management. Furthermore, Kerr, Lerner & Schoar (2010) find that start-ups 
receiving angel capital are 27% more likely to survive for at least 4 years compared to start-ups not 
receiving angel capital. They also find that these firms are 44% more likely to receive subsequent 
venture investment. These findings indicate the importance and potential of angel capital to the 
overall economy. An interesting follow-on question would be if governments could, with the same 
efficacy, provide angel capital to entrepreneurs and start-up firms, thereby increasing economic 
growth.  
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(2)  venture capital is a form of equity provided through venture capital funds, which, unlike angel 
capital organizations, are financial intermediaries. Venture capital funds usually invest in young firms, 
whose products or services are either in development or are commercially available, but have yet to 
establish a commercial organization and start selling. They also invest in firms with established 
organizations and products that need more capital to expand the business. This latter point about 
venture capital investments shows the overlap with growth capital investments. (Metrick 2007) 
(3) Growth Capital1 is most often provided through financial intermediaries, such as late-stage 
investments by venture capital funds, specialized growth capital investment firms, and to some 
extent more traditional buyout investment firms. Firms seeking growth capital are usually able to 
generate revenue and profit, but don’t have sufficient cash generation to fund major expansions, 
acquisitions, or other investments (e.g. entering new markets). (Metrick 2007) 
(4) Buyout Capital is equity investments, which is most often pooled with acquisition debt and used 
to make acquisitions with the aim of taking majority control over a mature company, or part of a 
company, already generating operating cash flows. The buyout capitalists hope to increase the 
profitability of the acquired firm and either relist the firm on a stock exchange or sell it to other 
investors after a few years, making a profit. The equity usually makes up between 10% and 40% of 
the total capital, with traditional bank debt and mezzanine debt making up the rest. The most 
famous buyout of all time is the $25billion purchase of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts 
(KKR) in 1989, but most buyouts are of “middle-market” companies receiving little attention by 
public markets, because they are engaged in mature industries with stable cash flows and limited 
potential for internal growth (Metrick 2007). According to Metrick (2007), total Buyout Capital under 
management is about three times larger than venture capital under management, which makes it the 
largest category of private equity. (Metrick 2007) 
(5) Distress Capital is similar to Buyout Capital, but specializes on making investments in distressed 
companies with subsequent long-term turnaround operations. (Metrick 2007) 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Growth_capital 
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2.0.0 Venture Capital in Brief 
 
As described above, venture capital focuses mostly on early-stage firms that have already completed 
the seed-stage and start-up stage and are at or near commercialization of its products. Venture 
capital providers are professional, institutional managers who provide venture capital through 
venture capital funds, i.e. financial intermediaries. Investors of venture capital commit an agreed 
amount to the venture capital fund, but they do not transfer the money to the fund until it is needed 
for investments into portfolio firms. Each venture capital fund is a separate Limited Partnership 
where the investors are called Limited Partners (LPs) and the managers of the fund are called 
General Partners (GPs). The venture capital organization, or the GPs, can simultaneously run several 
venture capital funds. LPs have limited liability to the venture capital fund, and are required not to be 
engaged in the day-to-day operations of the fund to keep the limited liability. Limited Partnerships 
are based on comprehensive contracts with many covenants to prevent the GPs from doing as they 
like with the LPs’ money. Each fund has a limited life span, usually between 7 to 12 years, and can 
also have a defined investment strategy (e.g. only invest in biotech or IT, or only invest in early-stage 
or late-stage firms). Since each fund has a limited life span, each investment must be viable to 
succeed in a few years, and all investments made by the fund must be exited before the end of the 
fund’s life. Each portfolio firm receives staged funding, meaning that after an initial funding of a firm 
the venture capital fund typically reserves 3 to 4 times the first investment for follow-on investments 
in subsequent funding rounds. (Gompers & Lerner 1999) 
The investments are made into essentially illiquid stocks, which, more or less, make them worthless 
unless the firms succeed in commercializing its products so that the firms can be sold through an IPO 
or a sale to other investors several years down the road. Clearly, venture capital investments are 
long-term, high-risk investments, and “the payoff comes after the company is acquired or goes 
public. Although the investor has high hopes for any company getting funded, only one in six ever 
goes public and one in three is acquired.”(NVCA 2010 Yearbook). This explains why venture capital 
organizations are so focused on thorough due diligence before selecting which firms to invest in, and 
why they spend so much resources on monitoring and actively engaging in the portfolio firm after 
making the first investment; venture capitalists usually take at least one position on the board of 
directors of their portfolio firms, and they use their reputation and network among industry 
professionals to attract and hire high-quality management to their portfolio firms. “For every 100 
business plans that come to a venture capital firm for funding, usually only 10 or so get a serious 
look, and only one ends up being funded.”…”These days, a business concept needs to address world 
markets, have superb scalability, be made successful in a reasonable timeframe, and be truly 
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innovative. A concept that promises a 10 or 20 percent improvement on something that already 
exists is not likely to get a close look” (NVCA 2010 Yearbook). A concept that promises an 
incremental improvement on something that already exists is more likely to be developed in large 
corporations attempting to improve their current technology. On the other hand, these same 
corporations are unlikely to be willing to invest in new technologies that will make their current 
technologies and operations completely obsolete. “Many talented teams have come to the venture 
capital process when their projects were turned down by their companies” (NVCA 2010 Yearbook).  
Another characteristic of venture capital funds is that they increasingly make the decision to invest 
conditional on another venture capital fund agreeing on becoming a syndication partner in the 
investment, another venture capital fund that agrees that the investment is attractive and is willing 
to co-invest (Gompers & Lerner 1999). There are several reasons for this, which I will come back to 
later.  
I will now use Metrick’s (2007) five main characteristics of venture capital to sum up what I have 
presented about venture capital so far. (1) venture capital is provided through venture capital funds, 
which are financial intermediaries. (2) venture capital investments are made only into private firms. 
(3) venture capital organizations take an active role in monitoring and helping the companies in its 
portfolio. (4) The primary goal of venture capitalists is to maximize the return on its investments into 
portfolio firms by way of an IPO or a sale to other investors. (5) venture capital investments are made 
to fund the internal growth of companies, as opposed to growth through acquisitions.  
Below (table 1) are some famous examples of successful venture capital investments during the 
venture capital industry’s 60 years of existence: 
 
Table 1 – Source: NVCA 2010 Yearbook 
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3.0.0 Venture Capital – The Free Market Solution to a Market Failure 
 
The following chapter describes three factors, Information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral 
hazard, which are the cause of a certain type of market failure, and explains that the consequence of 
this market failure is that certain high-risk projects are unable to raise external financing. The chapter 
then explains how venture capital is able to mitigate some of these problems and provide financing 
for some of these high-risk projects. The sources of the knowledge presented in this chapter are Hall 
& Lerner (2009), Peneder (2009) and lecture notes from the corporate finance course at NHH.  
Information asymmetry refers to a situation where the insiders, for example the entrepreneurs, are 
better informed about the firm’s operations and risks than its investors and creditors; the 
information is asymmetrically distributed among stakeholders. The problem of adverse selection and 
moral hazard on the part of the entrepreneur arises from the separation of ownership and 
management, where the entrepreneur has an incentive to engage in behavior that is not value-
maximizing to the financiers. Ownership, in this context, can also extend to debt financing as that 
entails ownership of part of the firm’s future cash flow. Adverse selection and moral hazard are so 
called agency costs and can only occur when there are information asymmetries.  
To explain these terms I will use an example of an entrepreneur looking to borrow traditional bank 
debt. When there are severe information asymmetries, the bank cannot accurately monitor the risk 
taking of the entrepreneur, and would not be able to see if the entrepreneur increased the risk of the 
firm’s operations after receiving the debt financing. After the entrepreneur has received the debt 
financing the incentives for risk shifting arise. It is this incentive for risk shifting that is called moral 
hazard and can be explained as follows. The equity can be seen as a call option on the firm, and the 
debt can be seen as a risk free asset minus a put option on the firm (see figure 2). 
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Figure 2 – Source: Lecture notes in Corporate Finance at NHH (Fall 2009) 
One of the drivers of the value of options is the variance, or the risk, of the underlying asset, which in 
this case is the firm. Increased variance makes an option more valuable, because the probability of 
getting a large payout increases; this applies to both call and put options. This means that the 
entrepreneur, who is the equity owner, or the owner of the call option, has an incentive to increase 
the risk of the firm thereby increasing the probability of a large payout. On the other hand, the 
increased risk reduces the value of the debt, because the value of the debt is equal to a risk free 
investment minus a put option. As long as the bank cannot accurately observe the actions of the 
entrepreneur and adjust the interest rates on the debt according to the increased risk of the firm, the 
entrepreneur has an incentive to increase risk, thereby increasing the value of the equity at the 
expense of the bank.  
To compensate for risk shifting, the bank would ideally want to raise the interest rates on the debt. 
But since it cannot accurately monitor the firm, it can also not discriminate between those firms that 
act in the best interest of the bank and those undertaking risk shifting at the expense of the bank. It 
would have to raise the interest rates on all firms were severe information asymmetries exist. The 
higher interest rates would discourage all but the most risky borrowers, so that only the risky 
borrowers would end up borrowing money from the bank, and the quality of the bank’s loan pool 
would decline markedly. This effect is the adverse selection problem. Instead of raising interest rates, 
the bank uses covenants to restrict the amount of lending and demands collateral in the form of 
tangible assets to reduce the problem of moral hazard. The bank will also preclude lending to firms 
where the problem of asymmetric information is particularly severe.  
The problem of information asymmetry is not limited to debt financing. In the case of an 
entrepreneur receiving external equity from outside investors, the entrepreneur can take advantage 
of the information asymmetry by engaging in wasteful spending, (e.g. a lavish office, corporate 
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parties, expensive company cars etc.) from which the entrepreneur benefits disproportionately but 
does not bear their entire cost. The entrepreneur might also pass up a favorable investment 
opportunity because there is a certain probability that the company goes bankrupt and the 
entrepreneur loses his/her job. Since most investors are wary of this problem they will demand a 
higher rate of return than would be the case if the funds were internally generated. Even if the 
manager is motivated to maximize shareholder value, informational asymmetries may make raising 
external capital more expensive or even preclude it entirely.  
To sum up, those firms that are particularly prone to information asymmetries and do not have 
sufficient tangible assets for collateral will most likely not receive traditional financing from banks or 
external investors. Thus, when these firms cannot generate sufficient internal cash or the 
entrepreneurs do not possess sufficient capital on their own, they will not be able to finance their 
projects.  
Michael Peneder explains it differently in his 2009 article “The impact of Venture capital on 
Innovation Behavior and Firm Growth”. He writes: “In the ideal case of perfect markets without 
information problems, the amount of financially feasible projects for risk-neutral capital investors is 
exclusively determined through the expected profits and therefore independent of the extent of 
uncertainty Var(π).” He goes on to write: “In imperfect markets with asymmetric information, 
additional costs   are generated through the need for more elaborate selection and monitoring 
processes in order to mitigate problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.” He concludes by 
writing that: “In this situation a financing gap arises, as certain projects are no longer considered 
financially feasible due to increased monitoring, advising, and control costs (even if the expected 
profits are positive in the case of perfect information).” Here, Peneder touches upon an important 
consequence of risk and return in situations of asymmetric information; the amount of financially 
feasible projects for risk-neutral capital investors is not independent of risk, but rather determined 
by the interaction of risk and return. This is because the greater the uncertainty, the greater is the 
cost to overcome the information asymmetry, and the higher is the required return by investors. If 
we also conclude that investors are not, in fact, risk neutral, but rather risk averse, then the impact of 
information asymmetry is further amplified. I have illustrated this point in figure 3.  
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Figure 3 – Source: Simplified and modified version of Peneder’s 2009 figure 
The ideal market situation referred to in the figure assumes perfect capital markets with no 
taxes, no transaction costs, no information asymmetries and risk-neutral investors. The 
imperfect market situation referred to in the figure only adds information asymmetries and 
risk-averse investors but keeps the assumptions of no taxes and no transaction costs.  
Given the assumptions of the ideal market situation, investors will be willing to finance any projects 
with an expected return above the risk free rate. Given the assumptions of the imperfect market 
situation, investors will still be willing to finance projects with an expected return close to the risk 
free rate when the uncertainty is very low (i.e. when the cost associated with information asymmetry 
are negligible). As the uncertainty increases and the costs to mitigate information asymmetries 
increases, investors will demand increasingly higher expected returns to compensate for the 
increased risk and increased costs to overcome information asymmetries. As figure 3 hints at, 
information asymmetries can be at least partly overcome by intensively scrutinizing firms before 
providing capital and then monitoring them afterwards. This alleviates some of the information gaps 
and reduces capital constraints to those firms that are particularly prone to the problems of 
information asymmetries.  
Banks, Insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and public stock exchanges, which can be 
considered traditional sources of finance, only go so far as to alleviate information gaps and provide 
funding to marginal projects. They will only pay for selection and monitoring as long as their marginal 
cost of engaging in additional selection and monitoring is lower than their marginal benefit. The top 
boundary in figure 3 represents marginal projects financed by these traditional sources of capital. 
The middle boundary in figure 3 represents marginal projects financed by venture capital 
organizations, which is lower than the boundary for traditional sources of capital. This resets on an 
important assumption about venture capital organizations, namely that their specialization with 
high-risk projects provides them with competitive advantages in selecting and monitoring high-risk 
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investments; their marginal cost of overcoming problems of information asymmetry and agency 
costs is lower than that of traditional capital providers. The implication of this insight is that venture 
capital organizations will seek to invest only in those firms that are particularly prone to problems of 
information asymmetry and agency costs, in which venture capital organizations have the most to 
gain on their competitive advantage in selection and monitoring.  
By their very nature, young R&D firms within the high-tech IT and biotechnology industries are the 
ones most prone to problems of information asymmetry and agency costs. Young firms have little 
history to show for, which increases the uncertainty about their future performance. Firms engaged 
in Research and Development (R&D) also have highly uncertain futures, because there is no 
guarantee that their research efforts will pay off, and they usually have very little tangible assets to 
put up as collateral; investing in R&D firms is tantamount to buying a call option on a particular R&D 
effort. Furthermore, since high-tech IT and biotechnology is so complex and advanced, it requires 
expertise to have genuine insights into their workings and potential. Consequently, firms with all of 
these traits will be most prone to problems of information asymmetry and agency costs. Following 
this argument and the last argument in the previous paragraph, venture capital funds will invest 
mostly in these types of firms, where they will have the greatest benefit from their expertise in 
selecting and monitoring.  
There is one last tool, besides intense selection and monitoring, venture capitalists use to reduce the 
incentive for destructive behavior on the part of the entrepreneur due to moral hazard, which has 
given the venture capital industry a reputation as a sort of thief of companies. This tool was studied 
by Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) who documented how venture capitalists allocate control and 
ownership rights contingent on financial and non-financial performance. If a portfolio company 
performs poorly, venture capitalists obtain full control. As performance improves, the entrepreneur 
obtains more control. If the firm does well, the venture capitalists relinquish most of their control 
rights but retain their equity stake. So, in order to remain in control of their company the 
entrepreneur has to work hard to ensure good progress and performance.  
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4.0.0 The History of Venture Capital 
 
Banks have long functioned in the same fundamental way; they provide loans to businesses in 
exchange for an interest rate and secure those loans by demanding collateral in the businesses’ 
assets. If entrepreneurs did not generate sufficient cash on their own, did not have wealthy friends 
(Angel investors), and could not provide valuable collateral, then they were unable to fund their 
projects; until one man came up with the innovation called Venture capital. That man was George 
Doriot, who established the world’s first venture capital organization called American Research and 
Development Corporation (ARD) in 1946. “Unlike modern funds, it was organized as a corporation 
and was publicly traded. In its 25-year existence as a public company, ARD earned annualized returns 
for its investors of 15.8 percent” (Metrick 2007). The venture capital industry grew slowly in the first 
decade, but recognizing the potential of venture capital, the US government established so called 
Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) after the Small Business Act of 1958 was enacted, 
which, first and foremost, served to train a pool of venture capitalists for later decades. The structure 
of limited partnerships described in the previous section was developed in the 1960s. It had become 
the dominant investment structure in venture capital funds by 1978, and is by far the most common 
form of organization in the venture capital industry today (Hall & Lerner 2009). Despite the creation 
of SBICs and the limited partnership structure, total venture capital fundraising was still less than 
$1billion a year throughout the 1970s (Metrick 2007).  
In the following decade, the growth of the venture capital industry increased substantially, and the 
following quote explains both the early slow growth and why it was boosted: “Activity in the venture 
industry increased dramatically in early 1980s. Much of the growth stemmed from the US 
Department of Labor’s clarification of Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s ‘prudent man’ rule 
in 1979, which had prohibited pension funds from investing substantial amounts of money into 
venture capital or high-risk  asset classes. The rule clarification explicitly allowed pension managers 
to invest in high-risk assets, including venture capital” (Hall & Lerner 2009). “To this day, pension 
funds continue to supply nearly half of all the money for venture capital in the United States. The 
participation by pension funds hastened the participation for other institutional investors, and the 
modern era of venture capital began” (Metrick 2007).  
As capital commitments to venture capital funds grew, so did the cyclicality of the venture capital 
industry, creating serious instability in venture capital investments, which can be seen in figure 7 
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showing year over year changes in capital commitments2, capital under management3, and 
investments, as well as changes to GDP. Metrick (2007) has divided the history of the venture capital 
industry from 1980 until today into three periods: The pre-boom period (1980-1994), the boom 
period (1995-2000), and the post-boom period (2000-today), and the division is quite clear when 
looking at the venture capital investment statistics (see figures 4, 5, and 6). Venture capital 
commitments exploded from 1996 to 2000 when returns related to the internet bubble started 
climbing, which as we all know, burst in 2000 and sent the world economy into a recession, with a 
sharp decline in new venture capital commitments as a natural consequence. “…the industry as 
whole may lose more dollars from its investments in 1999 and 2000 than it made in all prior years 
combined” (Metrick 2007). Venture capital commitments relative to GDP has also been highly 
volatile and capital commitments to the venture capital industry as a share of GDP was almost at the 
same level in 2009 as they were in the pre-boom period. Consequently, venture capital under 
management both in absolute values and relative to GDP is likely to continue its decline for another 
few years before it stabilizes; the fact that funds have a life of about 7-10 years creates a delay from 
changes in capital commitments until capital under management is affected. As old venture capital 
funds are discontinued, some capital will not be funneled back into new venture capital funds. 
Venture capital investment largely follows new venture capital commitments, but is slightly less 
volatile. This is as one would expect, since it takes some time from the funds are established until 
they have found the right projects to invest in.  
A question raised by Metrick is how large a share of GDP should optimally be invested in venture 
capital backed firms? He emphasized that most innovation happens in large corporations like 
Microsoft, IBM, Intel, Pfizer etc, and that only innovation in small firms with a potential to penetrate 
large markets is backed by venture capital funds. So how much innovation should occur in small 
firms? He does not propose an exact figure, but he refers to the theory of the firm introduced by 
Ronald Coase (1937), which says that “a universal reduction in transactions costs should reduce the 
optimal scale of ﬁrms and allow for greater levels of innovation by small companies” (Metrick 2007). 
Everyone would agree that transaction costs have gone down in the past few decades, and that the 
higher levels of venture capital investments in the post-boom period compared to the pre-boom 
period could possibly be explained by this theory.  
 
                                                             
2
 Capital commitments refer to the process were investors to venture capital funds promise to provide capital 
as they are needed by the venture capital funds.  
3
 Capital under management refers to the cumulated capital commitments that have been promised by 
investors, i.e. total capital available for investments by venture capital funds (incl. investments already made).  
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Figure 4 – Source: NVCA 2010 Yearbook 
 
 
Figure 5 – Source: NVCA 2010 Yearbook 
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Figure 6 – Source: NVCA 2010 Yearbook 
 
 
Figure 7– Source: NVCA 2010 Yearbook 
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5.0.0 Patterns of Venture Capital Investments 
 
Firstly, figure 8 shows which investors supply the capital to the venture capital industry: 42% comes 
from pension funds, 25% comes from finance and insurance corporations, 21% comes from 
endowments and foundations, 10% comes from individuals and families, and 2% comes from 
corporations operating funds (NVCA Venture capital 101).  
Secondly, figure 9 shows how venture capital investments made from 1991 to 2000 were exited: 14% 
of venture capital backed firms went public, 33% were acquired, 18% are known to have failed, and 
35% either remain privately owned or have an unknown outcome (NVCA Venture capital 101).  
 
 
Figure 8 – Source: NVCA “Venture capital 101” 
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Figure 9 – Source: NVCA “Venture capital 101” 
 
5.1.0 Investments by Industry 
Venture capital investments have, at least since 1980, been concentrated in two broad sectors; IT 
and Healthcare. IT includes IT services, software, semiconductors, and hardware, as well as Telecom 
and telecom equipment. We could also include the Media and entertainment category, since much 
of the media and entertainment investments are internet related. Healthcare includes Biotechnology 
and Healthcare devices and equipment. The two broad sectors made up about 50% of US venture 
capital investments in 1980 and almost 80% of US venture capital investments in 2009 (see figure 
10), and their dominant position among venture capital funds is not coincidental. Since venture 
capital investments need to have the potential to grow quickly and penetrate large markets they 
generally need a technological advantage, hence venture capital funds focus on the high-tech 
industries of healthcare and IT.  
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Figure 10 – Source: NVCA 2010 Yearbook 
 
5.2.0 Investments by Stage 
Venture capital investments can also be broken down into stages of firm development; startup stage 
(or seed stage), early stage, expansion stage, and late stage. When the venture capital industry began 
its upward trend in 1980, the fraction of venture capital going to late stage firms was relatively small, 
and the fraction of venture capital going to firms in the other three stages was of roughly equal size 
(see figure 11). What is clear from the figure is that up until the year 2000 the relative share of 
expansion stage investments rose and the relative share of startup stage investments declined. By 
2000, the relative share of expansion stage investments made up about half of all venture capital 
investments. Metrick (2007) attributes this development to three factors: Angel Capital largely 
replaced venture capital in startup stage investments, some new venture capital firms were created 
to focus on later stages, and some old venture capital firms grew so large from their success that 
they needed to find larger investments to invest all their capital. The large influx of new venture 
capital commitments during the dotcom bubble must have exacerbated the need for larger 
investments to put all the capital to work, which is probably why new venture capital firms were 
created to focus on later stages.  
After 2000, the relative share of late stage investments grew substantially, and the relative share of 
expansion stage investments declined. This might be explained by two factors: a natural 
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development as many of the expansion stage investments matured into late stage investments, and 
losses related to venture capital investments during 1999 and 2000 were so great, and new venture 
capital commitments dropped so much, that the need to find larger investments to invest all the 
capital in was reversed. Also, after 2000, the relative share of startup stage investments has gradually 
started increasing, so that in total, the development from 1980 until 2000 seems to be reversing. 
(The source of all venture capital investment numbers is the NVCA 2010 Yearbook).  
 
 
Figure 11 – Source: NVCA 2010 Yearbook 
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6.0.0 Venture Capital in Norway 
 
Norway is a small country and the Norwegian Venture capital & Private Equity Association is fairly 
young and only has a few years of records on the venture capital industry. Also, the association does 
not distinguish explicitly between venture capital and the broader Private Equity category in many of 
its statistics, so many of the numbers and graphs presented in this chapter are from the Private 
Equity industry as a whole. Keep this in mind when reading the comparisons between the statistics of 
venture capital in the USA presented in chapters 4 and 5 and the statistics presented in this chapter.  
Nevertheless, as this paper includes an empirical study on venture capital in Norway, it is useful to 
spend a little time on the statistics of the Norwegian Venture capital & Private Equity Association 
presented in their 2009 activity survey.  
New capital commitments to venture capital funds in Norway is very volatile and reached a record 2 
billion NOK in 2008 and a low of 106 million NOK in 2009; capital under management nearly doubled 
from about 4 billion NOK in 2006 to above 7 billion NOK in 2009; due to the establishment of 
Investinor and the capital expansion at Argentum, the Norwegian government accounted for 44% of 
new funds in 2008 and 2009; total new investments increased by more than threefold between 2003 
and 2007, and subsequently fell sharply back to 2005 levels in 2009; The ICT, renewable energy and 
environmental technology, life science and biotechnology, and petroleum sectors made up about 
three quarters of all new investments in 2009 as well as all accumulated investments at the end of 
2009 both in terms of the number of investments and the investment amount; and, lastly, by far the 
largest form of divestments in 2008 and 2009 were sales to industrial buyers, while only one 
divestment was in the form of an IPO.  
6.1.0 New Capital Commitments 
After seeing a doubling in capital under management compared to five years earlier, new capital 
commitments fell to just 106 million Euro in 2009, down from a record 2095 million Euro in 2008 (see 
figure 12). There were raised 7 new funds and 3 funds had second closings. The new capital 
commitments as a percentage of GDP in Norway can be compared against the new capital 
commitments in the USA seen in Figure 4; Norway’s new capital commitments were lower in the last 
years of the boom-period and somewhat higher in the post-boom period after 2000, particularly in 
the last few years (keep in mind that the Norwegian numbers include capital commitments to buyout 
funds, which the US numbers do not).  
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Figure 12 – Source: Norwegian Venture capital and Private Equity Association “Activity survey 2009” 
 
6.2.0 Capital under Management 
Capital under management stabilized after a few big funds were closed at the end of their lifetime, 
thereby outweighing the new capital commitments (see figure 13). Capital under management 
seems to have increased quite sharply, from about 4 billion Euros in 2006 to 7155 million Euros in 
2009, equivalent to 2.6% of GDP, which is substantially higher than capital under management in the 
US seen in Figure 5.  
A breakdown of capital under management relative to the stages of firm development shows that 
Buyout funds and Start-up funds were by far the two biggest categories in 2009 with 3302 and 2847 
million Euros under management respectively, while Expansion funds had 607 million Euros under 
management and Seed funds 399 million Euros under management (see figure 14). The figure also 
shows that capital under management in Buyout funds and Start-up funds increased a lot between 
2004 and 2009, while capital under management in Seed funds and Expansion funds only increased 
slightly.  
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Figure 13 – Source: Norwegian Venture capital and Private Equity Association “Activity survey 2009” 
 
 
Figure 14 – Source: Norwegian Venture capital and Private Equity Association “Activity survey 2009” 
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6.3.0 Investor Types 
A breakdown of investor type in new Private Equity funds established in 2008 and 2009 in Norway 
can be seen in figure 15; fund of funds made up 42% of which Argentum made up 21%; the public 
early-stage investment entity Investinor made up 23%; corporate investors 8%; family corporations 
8%; private pension funds 7%; public pension funds 5%; and other investor types (insurance 
corporations, banks, endowments, private investors, and others) made up the remaining 7%. The 
venture capital association wrote that pension funds and insurance corporations made up about 40% 
of investors in comparable European funds established in 2008 and 2009, while such institutional 
investors only made up 12% in Norway, so it is clear that the investor breakdown in Norway is 
somewhat unusual. The venture capital association also wrote that about 50% of the new capital 
came from foreign investors.  
The Norwegian government made up a sizeable portion of the new funds established in 2008 and 
2009 with a share of total new funds of 44%, in which Argentum made up 21% and Investinor 23%. 
Argentum is an asset manager specializing in Nordic Private Equity funds, i.e. Argentum is a fund of 
funds investor. Argentum was formally established in 2001 by the Norwegian Government with a 
share capital of 2.45 billion NOK. It is wholly owned by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
and the government decided to expand Argentum’s total share capital by 2 billion NOK between 
2008 and 2009. Investinor is a fully owned subsidiary of Innovation Norway, which itself is owned by 
the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry. Investinor was established through parliamentary 
proposition number 8 of 2007-2008 and is mandated to manage 2.2 billion NOK on behalf of the 
Norwegian government. Investinor operates much like any other venture capital fund in that it 
invests risk capital into internationally oriented and competitive Norwegian firms in early and 
expansion stages, takes an active leadership role in its portfolio firms, and has a goal of exiting its 
investments within 3-7 years.  
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Figure 15 – Source: Norwegian Venture capital and Private Equity Association “Activity survey 2009” and Argentum’s 
annual report 2009 
 
6.4.0 New Investments 
Although capital under management has stopped growing, investments by Private Equity funds have 
continued, so that the difference between capital under management and accumulated investments 
has decreased somewhat (see figures 13 and 16). Total new investments, as seen in figure 13, 
increased sharply until it peaked in 2007 at almost 800 million Euros. Total investments later fell to 
596 million Euros in 2008 and 319 million Euros in 2009. As a percentage of GDP, total investments 
were about the same in Norway as in the USA during the post-boom period (see figure 6 and 16). As 
explained in the previous paragraph, Argentum was formally established by the Norwegian 
Government in 2001, and made its first investment in 2002. With a total share capital of 2.45 billion 
NOK at its formation, it is not unthinkable that the establishment of Argentum greatly contributed to 
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bring total new venture capital investments in Norway up to the American level, relative to GDP, 
during the post-boom period.  
The venture capital association wrote that the financial crisis had a strong negative impact on new 
investments by Private Equity funds, but that new investments started growing again by the second 
quarter of 2009, and more than two thirds of new investments in 2009 were made in the second half 
of 2009. We can therefore expect venture capital investments to continue to grow in the coming 
years.  
Figure 17 shows a breakdown of new investments into firm stages; the fraction of venture capital 
going to firms in the seed stage has remained low and relatively stable since 2003; the fraction going 
to firms in the start-up stage has clearly trended upwards, and stood at about 50% in 2009; the 
fraction going to firms in the expansion stage, on the other hand, has clearly trended downwards 
from 65% in 2003 to only about 10% in 2009; and lastly, the fraction going to buyouts peaked at 
about 50% in 2007, but has since been falling to about 40% in 2009.  
Figure 18 shows a breakdown by industry of new and follow-on investments in 2009 and it is clearly 
the ICT segment that has received most attention both in number of new and follow-on investments 
and in million Euros, comprising almost a third of the total. There are four segments that stand out as 
most important to the Private Equity industry, as seen by figure 18; ICT, Renewable energy & 
environmental technologies, Life science & biotechnology, and Petroleum. They made up about 
three quarters of total investments, both in number of investments and in invested amounts. 
Compared to investments in the USA, as seen in figure 10, the Norwegian composition has a higher 
tilt towards petroleum and clean-tech, but that might be quite natural when you consider that 
Norway has a large oil and gas production and also has a strong tradition for renewable energy 
production in the form of hydropower.  
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Figure 16– Source: Norwegian Venture capital and Private Equity Association “Activity survey 2009” 
 
 
Figure 17 – Source: Norwegian Venture capital and Private Equity Association “Activity survey 2009” 
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Figure 18 – Source: Norwegian Venture capital and Private Equity Association “Activity survey 2009” 
 
6.5.0 Total Investment Positions 
The four major segments mentioned in the previous paragraph are, not surprisingly, also the four 
largest segments when considering all investments held by Private Equity funds at the end of 2009 
(see figure 19). Private Equity funds were invested in 216 portfolio firms within the ICT segment,  102 
portfolio firms within the Life science & biotechnology segment, 85 portfolio firms within the 
Petroleum segment, and 71 portfolio firms within the Renewable energy & environmental 
technology segment. Once again, it is clear that the ICT segment is dominant with about a third of 
the total, and the four largest segments made up about three quarters of the total, about the same 
fraction as new investments.  
Accumulated investments held at the end of 2009 came to 31724 million Euros, compared to total 
capital under management of 7155 million Euros (see figure 20); after having received capital 
commitments from investors it takes time for venture capital funds to find appropriate investments, 
and when they do find a candidate, they reserve 3 to 4 times the first capital investment for 
additional capital injections through staged investments, which explains why total capital under 
                                                             
4
 Discrepancies between the numbers in figures 13, 14 and 20 are due to rounding errors.  
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management is about twice the size as accumulated investments. Figure 20 shows a breakdown of 
accumulated investments by firm-stage; the largest segment was the Start-up segment with 1415 
million Euros in 319 portfolio firms; followed by the Buyout segment with 1086 million Euros in 96 
portfolio firms; the Expansion segment with 459 million Euros in 141 portfolio firms; and the Seed 
segment with 213 million Euros in 135 portfolio firms. As one might expect, accumulated 
investments per portfolio firm in the Buyout segment is much higher than in the other segments. 
Portfolio firms in the Buyout segment are usually larger and more mature than portfolio firms in the 
other segments, and the goal of the Buyout funds is to take full control in each firm or at least 
become the majority shareholder. Funds in the other segments, on the other hand, are usually 
minority shareholders in their portfolio firms.  
 
 
Figure 19 – Source: Norwegian Venture capital and Private Equity Association “Activity survey 2009” 
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Figure 20 – Source: Norwegian Venture capital and Private Equity Association “Activity survey 2009” 
 
6.6.0 Divestments 
Figure 21 shows how venture capital funds in Norway divested their investments in 2008 and 2009 
measured in number of portfolio firms. Divestments through IPOs have historically been, by far, the 
most profitable divestment form for venture capital funds, but as the figure shows, only 1 divestment 
was made through IPOs in 2008 and 2009. The very low number of IPOs is likely affected by the 
financial crisis, and can be expected to increase as the economy moves out of crisis mode and back 
into growth. Divestments by sale to other corporate buyers and other funds are on average the 
divestments with the second highest return, but these returns are much lower than the returns from 
IPOs (see chapter 7.3.0 for more details on the estimated historical average returns from venture 
capital divestments); there were 28 divestment to industrial buyers, the most prominent form of 
divestments, and 5 divestments to other funds in 2008 and 2009.  
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Figure 21 – Source: Norwegian Venture capital and Private Equity Association “Activity survey 2008” and “Activity survey 
2009” 
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Part 2: Venture Capital in More Detail and Some 
Empirical Findings 
 
7.0.0 The Venture Capital Cycle 
 
Gompers and Lerner (1999) wrote a comprehensive book on what they call the venture capital cycle, 
and the following chapter uses their book as the only reference for knowledge, facts, and figures 
about the venture capital cycle, and the chapter can be considered a summary of their findings.  
Gompers and Lerner (1999) present three key traits about the venture capital industry: (1) 
tremendous incentive and information problems, not only in the firms that receive venture capital 
financing but also between the investors or Limited Partners (LPs) and the venture capitalists or 
General Partners (GPs); (2) the strong interrelatedness of the three steps in the venture capital cycle, 
fundraising, investing, and exiting; and (3) the slow adjustment of the venture capital industry to 
changes in the supply of capital or demand for venture capital financing (investment opportunities).  
I have already written about incentive and information problems between the venture capital funds 
and the firms receiving venture capital financing, so I will not focus more attention on that. In the 
following I will explain the three steps of the venture capital cycle, fundraising, investing and exiting, 
and highlight the problems between LPs and GPs.  
As mentioned earlier, venture capital organizations are financial intermediaries specializing in 
providing equity capital to young, high-risk, firms. They do this by raising periodic venture capital 
funds, which are most often in the form of limited partnerships, with a 7 to 12 year life. Due to their 
limited life, venture capital investments must eventually be liquidated and the funds returned to the 
LPs, and the venture capital organizations must raise new funds to stay in business, usually once 
every 2 to 5 years. The most successful portfolio firms are liquidated through IPOs and make up the 
bulk of the venture capital returns. Other somewhat less successful portfolio firms are sold to other 
private investors. Unsuccessful firms have their assets liquidated, go bankrupt, or remain operational 
at moderate levels of activity.  
7.1.0 Fundraising 
In this part of the chapter, I will explain the nature of the fundraising process and present various 
empirical results related to the fundraising process.  
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The partnership agreement between GPs and LPs in the fundraising process is important because it is 
the crucial mechanism for limiting the behavior of GPs and aligning their incentives with the LPs. 
Many of the oversight mechanisms found in corporations – powerful boards of directors and the 
market for corporate control – are not available here. If LPs become involved in the day-to-day 
management of a venture capital fund, they risk losing their limited liability. No liquid market for 
partnership interests exists, and LPs are frequently restricted from selling their partnership interests. 
Consequently, the primary remedy for LPs is legal action triggered by a violation of the covenants in 
the agreement.  
7.1.1 Covenants 
So what do the covenants typically cover? There are three groups of covenants; (i) the first group 
regulates the overall management of the fund, (ii) the second group regulates the activities of the 
GPs, and (iii) the third group regulates the types of investments. (i) In the first group are covenants 
that: (1) limit the amount invested in any one firm; (2) limit the use of debt; (3) restrict co-
investments with the venture organizations earlier and later funds (remember that each fund is a 
separate limited partnership); (4) regulate reinvestment of profits. (ii) In the second group are 
covenants that: (5) limit GPs investment of personal funds in firms the venture capital fund is 
invested in; (6) limit GPs from selling their share of the venture capital fund’s profits; (7) limit GPs 
fundraising activities; (8) limit GPs outside activities; (9) limit the addition of new GPs. (iii) In the third 
group are covenants that: (10) limit the fraction of the fund invested in a given investment class; (11) 
limit the sum of the fractions invested in two or more investment classes.  
Each of these covenants is designed to address problems of incentive and information between LPs 
and GPs, and, without going into each and every one of them, here are some examples: (1) is 
designed to prevent GPs from attempting to salvage an investment in a poorly performing firm by 
investing significant resources in follow-on funding rounds. The GPs have an incentive to do this 
because their share of the profits can be seen as a call option on the venture capital fund, and they 
therefore gain disproportionately from increasing the risk of the portfolio at the expense of 
diversification; (5) is designed to prevent GPs from devoting excessive time to the firms they have 
personal investments in, and to avoid that they do not terminate funding to firms they have personal 
investments in that are performing poorly; (10) is designed to prevent GPs from investing in public 
securities, because the average compensation to money managers is an annual fee of about 0.5% of 
capital under management, while the typical compensation to GPs is 20% of profits and an annual 
fee of about 2.5% of capital under management.  
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Two approaches to understanding the determinants of covenants have emerged: (1) ‘The costly 
contracting theory’ predicts that because negotiation and enforcement of explicit provisions are 
costly, covenants are included only when the benefits of restricting activity are greater than the 
costs. (2) ‘The supply and demand hypothesis’ predicts that relative supply and demand conditions in 
the venture capital market affect the number of, and strength of, covenants and restrictions in long-
term contracts. This hypothesis is based on the observation that monetary compensation is highly 
standardized, and barely changes with changing supply and demand conditions in the venture capital 
market.  
Univariate comparisons give support to both theories. Regression analyses show that the proxies for 
the supply and demand hypothesis are significantly related to all three covenant groups, while the 
proxies for potential agency problems – the costly contracting hypothesis – are significantly related 
to covenant groups (i) restricting the management of the fund and (iii) restricting the investment 
types, but not to covenant group (ii) restricting the activities of the general partners. The regression 
results therefore give some support to both hypotheses.  
7.1.2 Monetary Compensation 
Contractually specified compensation is particularly important in the venture capital setting, because 
LPs cannot utilize many of the methods of disciplining managers found in corporations and must 
avoid direct involvement in the fund’s activities; removing a GP is a difficult and costly procedure. 
Consequently, compensation is one of the most contentious issues between LPs and GPs of venture 
capital funds.  
Gompers and Lerner found that 81% of the funds pay 20-21% of the profits to GPs. Although 
seemingly homogeneous, there are subtle differences in the profit sharing agreements; 
compensation for older and larger venture capital organizations is more sensitive to performance 
and more variable than the compensation of other venture capital organizations; the fixed 
component of compensation is higher for smaller, younger funds and funds focusing on high-
technology or early-stage investments; however, no relationship is found between incentive 
compensation and actual performance.  
Monetary compensation to GPs comprise of one part fixed annual fees and one part variable profit 
sharing. Two models have been developed to explain the compensation schemes to GPs in venture 
capital funds: the learning model, and the signaling model. The signaling model says that GPs will 
attempt to signal their abilities to potential investors through their compensation schemes in the 
contracts they offer, which means that GPs must know their level of ability beforehand. The learning 
model, on the other hand, is based on the theory that neither GPs nor investors know the GPs’ 
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abilities in new organizations. As GPs’ abilities become known, compensation schemes can reflect the 
updated information about ability.  
The empirical results related to variable compensation show that older and larger venture capital 
organizations command about a 1 percentage point greater share of profits than less established, 
smaller funds. This is significant at the 5% level and is consistent with the learning model. Funds 
focusing on high-tech and early-stage investments – investments with higher investment and 
monitoring costs – receive a larger share of profits, which is also significant at the 5% level. Larger 
and older venture capital organizations also have significantly greater variance in the share of profits 
that they receive, again consistent with the learning model.  
The empirical results related to fixed compensation show that older and larger venture capital 
organizations receive a lower fixed compensation than younger, smaller venture capital 
organizations, which is the opposite of what the signaling model predicted, while the learning model 
did not have a prediction about this result. Furthermore, funds focusing on high-technology and early 
stage investments – investments with higher investment and monitoring costs – have higher fixed 
compensation, which is predicted by both the learning model and the signaling model.  
The empirical results of the elasticity of compensation to fund performance are consistent with the 
predictions of the learning model, and not the signaling model; as abilities of GPs become known 
with greater certainty, explicit incentives, typically in the form of variable performance 
compensation, replace implicit career concerns. If high-technology and early stage funds differ from 
other funds only in the level of effort necessary to monitor the portfolio, fixed fees should be higher, 
but performance sensitivity should not differ, which is precisely what the empirical results show.  
The two models provide different predictions on whether performance-sensitive compensation 
negotiated at the time of the partnership agreement (ex-ante) will be associated with higher returns 
(ex-post). The learning model suggests that there will not necessarily be any relationship between 
pay sensitivity and performance; reputational concerns lead young GPs with little explicit incentive 
compensation to work hard and perform well. The signaling model suggests a positive relationship 
between pay sensitivity and success; higher ability GPs signal their ability by taking more risk and 
then work harder. There is no statistically significant relationship between compensation and 
performance, which is then consistent with the learning model. This also indicates that new GP 
entrants may not have superior information about their own investment abilities, and may be 
concerned about establishing a reputation. At the same time, investors are mostly sophisticated 
institutions that closely track performance, and it is reasonable to expect that novice GPs do not 
know their own investment abilities any better than their investors do.  
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Most empirical results support the learning model where the two models differ in their predictions, 
and it is natural to conclude that the learning model is the most accurate model in explaining GPs’ 
monetary compensation.  
7.1.3 Does The Venture Capital Organizational Structure Matter? 
The reliance on limited partnerships of finite life with substantial profit sharing has been claimed to 
be critical to the success of venture investments. This can be tested by comparing limited 
partnerships with venture funds sponsored by corporations and venture funds associated with 
commercial and investment banks. The corporate venture funds have similar missions and are 
staffed by professionals with similar backgrounds and experience, but the organizational and 
incentive structures in corporate venture funds are very different; they are usually structured as 
subsidiaries (not finite), and have much lower incentive-based compensation. The venture funds 
associated with commercial and investment banks usually retain the autonomous partnership 
structure employed by independent venture organizations, albeit with lower share of the profits 
accruing to the GPs. If the claim is true, then these corporate venture funds and bank associated 
venture funds should perform below the independent, limited partnership based venture funds. 
Either their process of selecting or overseeing investments would be distorted or the programs 
would prove unstable. It may be, however, that corporate and bank venture funds enjoy benefits 
associated with closely related activities that might offset some of these costs – this is called the 
complementarities hypothesis. To test this hypothesis and the claim that independent venture 
capital organizations are superior to other venture capital organizations, it is necessary to distinguish 
between independent venture capital organizations, corporate venture capital organizations with a 
strong strategic fit to the corporate parent, and corporate venture capital organizations without a 
strong strategic fit. Venture capital organizations related to banks are disregarded as they closely 
resemble independent venture capital organizations.  
The results from the analyses show that (1) corporate venture investments in entrepreneurial firms 
appear to be at least as successful, using the probability of the portfolio firms going public as a 
measure of success, as those backed by independent venture organizations, particularly when there 
is a strategic overlap between the corporate parent and the portfolio firm. (2) Although corporate 
GPs overall tend to invest at a premium to other venture groups, this premium appears to be no 
higher in investments with a strong strategic fit. (3) Corporate venture programs without a strong 
strategic focus appear to be much less stable, frequently ceasing operations after only a few 
investments and a few years, but strategically focused programs appear to be as stable as 
independent venture organizations.  
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The evidence suggests that the presence of a strong strategic focus is critical to the success of 
corporate venture funds. This subset of corporate funds appears to have been quite successful, 
despite having very different structures from traditional venture capital funds. This appears to 
challenge the emphasis in the finance literature on the importance of the partnership structure 
employed by independent venture organizations. The evidence is also consistent with the existence 
of complementarities that allow corporations to effectively select and add value to portfolio firms, 
but somewhat at odds with the suggestions that the structure of corporate funds introduces 
distortions and limits their effectiveness.  
7.2.0 Investing 
7.2.1 Staged Investments 
Staged capital infusions are the most potent control mechanism GPs can employ; the role of staged 
capital infusion is analogous to that of debt in highly leveraged transactions, keeping the 
owner/manager on a “tight leash” and reducing potential losses from bad decisions. GPs’ stated 
concern is that entrepreneurs have private information about the future viability of the firm, and 
that they always want to continue the firm, and may want to enrich their reputation through 
activities at investors’ expense. 
Staged capital infusions is an investment design to ensure that prospects for the firm are periodically 
reevaluated and that the option to abandon the project and limiting losses is maintained. The greater 
the need to gather information, the shorter the duration of an individual round of financing, and the 
more frequently the GPs monitor the entrepreneur’s progress.  
GPs weigh potential agency and monitoring costs when determining how frequently they should 
reevaluate projects and supply capital, and thus, how long the duration of an individual round of 
financing should be. Agency costs increase as the tangibility of assets declines, the share of growth 
options in firm value rises, and asset specificity grows (the more specific assets are, the fewer 
alternative uses they have, and the lower liquidation value they have). Hence, the duration of 
funding should be negatively related to expected agency costs.  
Gompers and Lerner used a sample of 792 firms that received venture capital financing between 
January 1961 and July 1992 for their empirical analyses.  
The average industry ratio of R&D to sales is 3.43 percent (median is 3.82 percent), while the average 
for all COMPUSTAT industries during the time period 1972-1992 was 1.3 percent. Asymmetric 
information and agency costs are a major concern in R&D-intensive firms, which may require 
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specialized knowledge to monitor. This confirms the suggestion about venture capital investments in 
chapter 3 that GPs specialize in industries in which monitoring and information evaluation is 
important and therefore most valuable.  
Regression analyses on the financing duration show that: (1) the duration of early- and middle-
financing rounds are not significantly different from late-financing rounds. (2) Financing duration 
declines with decreasing industry ratio of tangible assets to total assets, decreases in the market-to-
book ratio, and greater R&D intensity (they are significant between the 7 and 1 percent confidence 
level). These factors are associated with greater agency costs and lower liquidation values, and hence 
increase the value of monitoring, and therefore lead to tighter monitoring. The analyses also show 
that the ratio of tangible assets to total assets remains the most significant variable in measuring the 
impact of asset specificity on financing duration. This result indicates that tangible assets may be 
particularly important in lowering expected agency costs. (3) The age of venture capital-backed firms 
at the time of financing is positively and significantly related to financing duration; more information 
may be available for GPs to evaluate. (4) None of the coefficients on amount of venture capital 
financing are significantly related to funding duration, so that larger financing rounds do not lead to 
longer funding duration. (5) The duration increases with increased commitments of capital to the 
venture industry.  
Regression analyses on the financing size show that: (1) the ratio of tangible assets to total assets has 
the greatest effect on the amount of financing, i.e. increases in asset tangibility increase the amount 
of financing per round. (2) More R&D intensive industries also appear to receive more financing per 
round controlling for asset tangibility. (3) The stage of development does affect the amount of 
financing per round; average early-financing round investments are between $1.30 and $2.03 million 
smaller than comparable late-financing round investments; average middle-financing round 
investments are between $0.70 and $1.21 million smaller than comparable late-financing round 
investments. The increasing size of investment per round reflects the growing scale of a firm when a 
firm matures through the various stages; greater investment is needed to expand the firm. (4) The 
financing amount increases with increased commitments of capital to the venture industry.  
Regression analyses on total venture financing show that: (1) firms that go public receive between 
$3.36 and $5.67 million more venture capital financing than firms that remain private. (2) There are 
no significant differences in total venture capital received between firms that are acquired or merged 
and those that are liquidated compared to those firms that remain private. (3) Even controlling for 
the number of funding rounds, firms that eventually go public receive more total financing. (4) 
Industry factors appear to have an important impact on total venture financing received; firms with 
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more tangible assets receive less total financing; firms in industries with high market-to-book ratios 
receive more total financing; R&D intensive industries receive significantly greater amounts of 
financing. (5) However, the most important factor in determining the total amount of venture capital 
financing received is the number of funding rounds received. In fact, when the number of funding 
rounds is included in regressions with industry variables, tangibility of assets and R&D intensity are 
no longer significant for total venture capital financing, but the coefficient on industry market-to-
book ratio is unchanged. (6) Even controlling for the number of funding rounds, firms in industries 
with high market-to-book ratios receive more total venture capital financing.  
If the market-to-book ratio correctly measures potential profitability of investments and growth 
opportunities, then total venture capital financing in these firms should be relatively higher. 
Alternatively, firms in these industries may have more difficulties obtaining debt financing, and may 
rely more heavily on venture capital financing.  
Regression analyses on the number of rounds show that: (1) firms that go public receive more 
financing rounds than those that remain private. (2) Firms that are acquired or go bankrupt do not 
receive more rounds on average than those that remain private. (3) Firms in industries with greater 
fraction of tangible assets receive fewer rounds of venture financing. (4) Firms in R&D intensive 
industries receive more rounds of financing.  
A plausible explanation for (1) and (2) is that GPs gather information about the potential profitability 
of projects over time. If GPs receive favorable information about the firm, strengthening the belief in 
the firm’s potential to go public, GPs continue to fund the project. If the project is viable but has little 
potential to go public, GPs start searching for a corporate buyer. Firms that have little potential are 
liquidated.  
7.2.2 How General Partners Oversee Firms 
GPs take at least one board seat on the board of directors in their portfolio firms and thereby engage 
in the day-to-day operation of the firm. GPs’ oversight of new firms involves substantial costs; the 
transaction costs associated with frequent visits and intensive involvement are likely to be reduced if 
GPs are proximate to the firms they oversee. Venture capital organizations with offices within 5 miles 
of the venture-backed firm’s headquarter are twice as likely to be board members as those more 
than 500 miles distant. Over half the firms in the sample have a GP director with an office within sixty 
miles of their headquarters. This has important implications due to the fact that venture capital 
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organizations are unevenly distributed among various regions5; the presence or absence of venture 
capital organizations may lead to significant differences in the availability and pricing of venture 
capital across regions. It might also have policy implications for local governments, since a local 
venture capital organization might be positively related to venture capital investments into the local 
economy.  
If GPs are especially important providers of managerial oversight, their representation on boards 
should be more extensive at times when the need for oversight is greater, for example at CEO 
transitions. The replacement of the top manager at an entrepreneurial firm is likely to coincide with 
an organizational crisis and therefore heighten the need for monitoring. In addition, since the 
uncertainty about the new person’s ability is likely to be high, the CEO’s activity may be more 
intensively monitored. At the funding rounds with CEO turnover, the increase in the representation 
of each class of board member is slightly higher than between rounds without CEO turnover, but the 
largest increase, by far, is in the number of GP directors, and this difference is significant at the 1 
percent level.  
If the provision of oversight is a significant and costly role for GPs, then proximity should be an 
important determinant of which GPs serve on the board. The results suggest that, for the majority of 
firms, the nearest GP director is quite close; more than half the firms have a GP director with an 
office within sixty miles of their headquarters, while 25 percent of the firms have a GP director within 
seven miles. In a Probit regression the coefficient for distance is highly significant in explaining the 
service of GPs on boards, even after controlling for ownership and experience.  
7.2.3 Syndication of Venture Capital Investments 
There have been suggested three reasons for why venture capital organizations share transactions 
with each other, so called syndication. (1) Syndicating first-round venture investments may lead to 
better decisions about whether to invest in firms. The first venture capital organization to accept a 
portfolio firm will make the investment contingent on another venture capital organization agreeing 
to co-invest in the portfolio firm. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) show that hierarchical organization, in which 
investments are made only if several independent observers agree, may be superior to one in which 
projects are funded after one affirmative decision. (2) Syndicating may be the result of information 
asymmetries between the lead venture capital organization and other potential new investors. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) develop a rationale for syndication in later venture rounds. A GP 
involved in the firm’s daily operations understands the details of the business. The GP may exploit an 
                                                             
5
 VC organizations have a tendency to cluster, which is evident by the fact that almost 50% of all VC under management, almost 50% of all 
VC investments, and about 40% of all VC portfolio firms in the USA is located in California, while Massachusetts makes up another large, yet 
significantly smaller, share of VC (NVCA 2010 Yearbook).  
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informational advantage, overstating the proper price for the securities in the next financing round. 
Under the models assumptions, the only way to avoid opportunistic behavior is if the lead venture 
capital organization maintains a constant share of the firm’s equity. This implies that later round 
financings must be syndicated. (3) Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991) suggest a third 
reason for syndication, “window dressing”. Pension funds “window dress” their portfolios, because 
institutional investors may examine not only quarterly returns but also end-of-period holdings. 
Consequently, money managers may adjust their portfolios at the end of the quarter by buying the 
firms whose shares have appreciated and selling “mistakes”. Venture capital organizations may 
similarly make investments in late rounds of promising firms, even if the financial returns are low. 
This strategy allows them to represent themselves in marketing documents as investors in these 
successful firms.  
(1) If the first reason for venture capital syndication is true, then established venture capital 
organizations should disproportionately syndicate first round investments with other established 
venture capital organizations compared to young and inexperienced venture capital organizations. 
This happens because established venture capital organizations will trust other established venture 
capital organizations’ investment opinions more than they do inexperienced venture capital 
organizations’ investment opinions. In later rounds, they should be much more willing to syndicate 
investments with less seasoned firms. To test this hypothesis, all venture capital organizations are 
divided into quintiles based on size as the proxy for experience and reputation, and analyzed for 
differences in each financing round separately. The smallest quintile of venture capital organizations 
is disproportionately likely to undertake early round transactions with each other; the smallest 
quintile of venture capital organizations syndicate 43% of their first round investments with other 
smallest quintile venture capital organizations. With each subsequent round, this pattern becomes 
less pronounced (second round 32% and later rounds 24%). It is not obvious, however, why largest 
quintile venture capital organizations syndicate first round investments more frequently with second 
quintile venture capital organizations (35%) than other largest quintile venture capital organizations 
(14%). A Pearson Chi-square-test tests the null hypothesis that each cell is 20% for each financing 
round separately. For first round investments, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent 
confidence level. For second and later round investments, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 
conventional confidence levels. Similar results appear when the age composition of venture capital 
organizations is used as the measure for experience and reputation.   
If the unwillingness of experienced venture capital organizations to invest with small and young 
venture organizations in the first round stems from a mistrust of inexperienced investors’ judgement, 
then experienced venture capital organizations should also be reluctant to invest in the later rounds 
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of deals begun by their less seasoned counterparts; Inexperienced venture capital organizations 
should be brought into later round financings by experienced venture capital organizations, but not 
vice versa. To assess this hypothesis, venture capital organizations investing for the first time in the 
second or later venture capital funding rounds are examined; later round venture capital investors 
should be less experienced than the previous investors. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis and significant at the 1 percent confidence level; the typical later-round syndication 
involves less experienced venture capital organizations investing in a deal begun by more established 
venture capital organizations.  
(2) If the second reason for venture capital syndication is true, then venture capital investors should 
maintain a near constant equity stake in their portfolio firms in all subsequent venture capital 
funding rounds after their initial investment. The statistics show that in the first financing round 
outside investors purchase, on average, 33.9% of the portfolio firm. In the second round, first-round 
investors purchase, on average, 30% of the new shares sold, which corresponds quite closely to their 
previous ownership position. The total equity stake held by outside investors increases to an average 
of 51.1% in the second round. In the third round, outside investors purchase, on average, 52.7% of 
new shares sold, which, once again, corresponds quite closely to their previous ownership position. 
The total equity stake held by outside investors increases to an average of 57% in the third round. In 
21 percent of the cases, the share of the firm held by a venture capital organization changes by less 
than 5 percent after a venture capital funding round. In 70.5 percent of the cases, the change is less 
than 25 percent. The results confirm the hypothesis of Admati and Pfleiderer that venture capital 
organizations strive to maintain a constant equity share in their portfolio firm.  
(3) Finally, the suggestion of “window dressing” in the syndication of venture capital investments is 
examined. An empirical implication of the hypothesis is that experienced venture capital 
organizations will invest in the later rounds of deals particularly likely to go public. A regression 
analysis shows that established venture capital organizations are significantly more likely to invest for 
the first time in later rounds when valuations have increased sharply. At the same time, valuation 
changes are insignificant in explaining the probability of investments by less established venture 
capital organizations. The results clearly support the hypothesis.  
The empirical findings clearly show that all three suggested reasons for why venture capital 
organizations syndicate their investments are true.  
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7.3.0 Exiting 
Venture capital funds seek to take public the most successful firms in their portfolios; the historical 
fraction of venture capital-backed firms that are taken public is 20-35%. Firms exited through IPOs 
represent the bulk of venture capital funds’ returns; even among the firms taken public, typically only 
a small number of firms make up the bulk of the returns. Other, less successful firms are liquidated, 
sold to corporate acquirers, or else remain operational at a modest level of activity without 
additional venture capital funding. A venture Economics study (1988a) found that a $1 investment in 
a firm that goes public provides an average cash return of $1.95 above the initial investment, with an 
average holding period of 4.2 years. The second most profitable exit, as estimated by Venture 
Economics, is by selling the firm to a corporation or another investment fund by means of 
acquisition, yielding an average cash return of only $0.4 above the initial investment, with an average 
holding period of 3.7 years.  
Successful exits are also critical to raising additional capital through new venture capital funds. After 
the 1987 market crash IPO activity in Europe and the USA dried up. While the US market recovered in 
the early 1990s the European market remained depressed. Consequently, European venture capital 
organizations were unable to exit investments by taking them public. They were required either to 
continue to hold the firms or to sell them to larger corporations, often at relatively unattractive 
valuations. While US venture capital organizations – pointing to their successful exits – were able to 
raise substantial amounts of new capital, European venture capital fundraising during this period 
remained depressed. Jeng and Wells (1997) examine the factors that influence venture capital 
fundraising in 21 countries and found that the strength of the IPO market is an important factor in 
determining venture capital commitments; this relationship is stronger for later-stage funds than for 
early-stage funds. In here lies another important policy implication; if a country wants a strong 
venture capital industry to support its entrepreneurial activities, then they need to create and 
maintain a strong IPO market.  
The exiting of venture capital investments also has important implications for social welfare. If 
venture capital organizations cannot foresee how a company will be mature enough to take public or 
to sell at the end of a decade (when the fund closes), they are unlikely to invest in the firm. 
Furthermore, if it was equally easy to exit investments of all types at all times, this might not be a 
problem, but interest in certain technologies by public investors appear to be subject to wide swings. 
Concerns about the ability to exit investments may have led to too many venture capital transactions 
being undertaken in “hot” industries. At the same time, insufficient capital may have been devoted 
to industries not in the public limelight. Promising technologies might not be developed if they are 
currently “out of favor”.  
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Concerns about exiting may also adversely affect portfolio firms once they are financed by, and 
under the influence of, venture capital organizations. Less scrupulous investors may occasionally 
encourage companies in their portfolio to undertake actions to boost the probability of a successful 
IPO, even if they jeopardize the firm’s long-term health; for example, increasing earnings by cutting 
back on vital research spending.  
Some institutions and features have evolved to improve the efficiency of the venture capital 
investment process, while others have sprung up primarily to shift more of the economic benefits to 
particular parties. Many of the features of the exiting of venture capital investments can be 
understood as responses to environmental uncertainties. An example is the “lock-up” provisions that 
prohibit corporate insiders and venture capital investors from selling their shares at the time of the 
offering. This helps avoid situations in which the officers and directors exploit their inside knowledge 
that a newly enlisted company is overvalued by rapidly liquidating their positions. Other features of 
the exiting process can be seen as attempts to transfer wealth between parties. For example, 
venture capital funds sometimes distribute shares to their investors immediately prior to a drop in 
price. Even if the price at which the investors ultimately sell the shares is far less, GPs use the share 
price before the distribution to calculate their fund’s rate of return and to determine when they can 
begin profit sharing (GPs only take part in profit sharing after the initial capital commitments by the 
LPs have been paid back). The efficiency and attractiveness of exiting venture capital investments will 
be determined by the relative strength of these two forces. Over time, an attractive environment for 
exits can exist only when formal and informal safeguards prevent opportunistic behavior.  
7.3.1 How Market Conditions Affect the Decision to Go Public 
GPs generate the bulk of their profits from firms that go public. Successful timing of the IPO market 
provides significant benefits to GPs, even though they rarely sell shares at the time of the offering; 
taking companies public when equity values are high minimizes the dilution of the venture investors’ 
ownership stake.  
To assess the ability of venture capital organizations to time public and private financings, the equity 
values of publicly traded biotechnology firms around these transactions are examined by 
constructing an equity value index. The IPOs coincide with the peaks in equity valuations, while no 
clear pattern appears in the private financings; in particular, the high valuations of 1983, 1986, and 
1991-92 were accompanied by intense IPO activity. These patterns suggest that venture capital 
organizations are able to time the market, taking firms public at times when industry valuations are 
highest.  
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The mean equity index at the time of IPOs is 4.05, compared to 3.05 at the time of private financings, 
and a nonparametric Wilcoxon test shows that the difference is significant at the 1 percent level; 
IPOs are far more likely to occur when the equity values are high. Since the bunching of IPOs and 
private financings implies that many of the sixty trading-day windows over which returns are 
calculated overlap, tests of equality of mean returns will overestimate the confidence levels. Instead, 
a regression framework is applied to test for differences in valuation. Returns in the three months 
before an IPO is significantly higher, at the 1 percent level, than returns in the three months after an 
IPO. Returns three months before and after private financings display no such difference. Returns 
prior to public and private financings do not differ at conventional confidence levels. However, 
returns after public and private financings differ at the 5 percent level.  
The results support the hypothesis that venture capital organizations are able to time the IPO 
market, and, thus, it is reasonable to assume that experienced venture capital organizations are 
better at timing the IPO market than inexperienced venture capital organizations. To test this 
hypothesis, the age of venture capital organizations is used as a proxy for experience and tested for 
differences. The average portfolio firm backed by venture capital organizations above the median 
age level went public when the equity index was at 4.31, compared to 3.8 for the average portfolio 
firm backed by venture capital organizations below the median age level. Similarly, the index run-up 
in the three months before an IPO and the run-down in the three months after are both larger for 
the average portfolio firm of more experienced venture capital organizations. These results suggest 
that firms backed by established venture capital organizations are more successful at timing their 
IPOs. Several analyses assess the robustness of the results to alternative measures of venture 
experience and the presence of control variables. They have little effect on the qualitative and 
quantitative results.  
The empirical evidence show that venture capital organizations take their portfolio firms public at 
market peaks, relying on private financings when valuations are lower. Furthermore, experienced 
venture capital organizations appear more proficient at timing IPOs to market peaks than do 
inexperienced venture capital organizations. The biotechnology industry was used as a sample. In 
other industries, the need for oversight, or lumpy demands for capital, as the firm matures may 
affect the decision to go public more dramatically.  
7.3.4 How Reputation Affects the Decision to Go Public 
Most LPs in venture capital funds are institutional investors whose role in the day-to-day operations 
of the fund is restricted by law if they are to retain limited liability. Evaluating a venture capital 
organization is therefore difficult, and investors search for signals of ability when evaluating venture 
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capital organizations. Past performance is the simplest way of evaluating ability, and it therefore has 
a great impact on venture capital organizations’ ability to raise new funds. Since young venture firms 
have little past performance, they have incentives to grandstand, that is, to take actions to signal 
their ability to make successful investments to current and potential new investors. Grandstanding 
would cause young venture capital organizations to bring portfolio firms public earlier than older, 
established venture capital organizations in an effort to establish a reputation in order to successfully 
raise new capital for new, subsequent funds. Remember that most of the returns to venture capital 
funds come from taking firms public. On the other hand, established venture capital organizations 
will have a longer track record, and one additional IPO is likely to have a small impact on their 
perceived ability to raise new funds. Since there are significant costs associated with a rushed IPO, in 
the form of underpricing of the portfolio firm, only young venture capital organizations will be willing 
to incur those costs, hurting the returns to their current venture capital funds.  
Predictions by the grandstanding hypothesis is: (1) the effect of recent performance in the IPO 
market on the amount of capital raised is stronger for young venture capital organizations, providing 
them with greater incentive to bring portfolio firms public earlier. (2) New venture capital 
organizations raise new funds sooner after an IPO than do established venture capital organizations. 
(3) If young venture capital organizations rush portfolio firms to the IPO market, they should have a 
shorter duration of representation on the portfolio firm’s board of directors and (4) have a smaller 
equity stake in the portfolio firm at the time of the IPO compared to portfolio firms going public 
backed by more established venture capital organizations. (5) Portfolio firms going public backed by 
young venture capital organizations should be more underpriced than others, because rushing them 
to the IPO market should mean the portfolio firms are younger, with a shorter history, and therefore 
more uncertainty.  
To test the grandstanding hypothesis, the sample of venture capital backed IPOs is divided into two 
groups by age, where the age of the lead venture capital organizations at IPO serves as a proxy for 
reputation. All lead venture capital organizations that are under six years old at the IPO date are 
classified as young. Although this is an imperfect measure of reputation, because experienced 
partners sometimes leave to start new venture capital organizations, it would tend to bias the result 
away from seeing any difference between young and old venture capital organizations. In addition, 
old venture capital organizations raise new funds every 2-4 years, while young venture capital 
organizations raise new funds every 5-6 years, meaning that the average IPO for old venture capital 
organizations should be closer to its next fund than the average IPO for young venture capital 
organizations, and should therefore also tend to bias the result away from seeing any difference. 
Despite of these two biases, young venture capital organizations raise new funds closer to their IPOs 
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than do old venture capital organizations. Furthermore, the results show that; the average size of 
young venture capital organization’s next fund is smaller; IPO firms backed by young venture capital 
organizations are younger on average; young venture capital organizations have sat on the board of 
directors of portfolio firms going public for a shorter period of time; portfolio firms backed by young 
venture capital organizations are more underpriced at their IPO; the average offering size is smaller 
for IPOs brought to market by young venture capital organizations; young venture capital 
organizations have financed fewer portfolio firms that have gone public; in portfolio firms that go 
public with young lead venture capital organizations the total equity stake held by venture capital 
funds is smaller; and the market value of the lead venture capital organization’s equity stake is lower 
for young venture capital organizations.  
All of these results are consistent with the grandstanding hypothesis; young venture capital 
organizations bring portfolio firms public earlier and bear real costs through greater underpricing and 
lower valued equity stakes. These costs are shared with their current LPs, but the portfolio firm going 
public also bears some of the costs. More than 400 new venture capital organizations entered the 
venture capital industry after 1978, and the incentives to grandstand potentially explain some of the 
declining returns on venture capital in the 1980s. Reduced fixed fees and increased profit sharing 
might better align the incentives of GPs with the value maximizing goals of their LPs.  
7.3.5 Distribution of Shares by Venture Capital Organizations 
Venture capital organizations raise money from investors and make equity investments in young, 
high-risk, high-growth companies. Many successful venture capital backed companies eventually go 
public in an underwritten IPO. Venture capital organizations can liquidate their position in the 
company by selling shares on the open market after the IPO and then pay those proceeds to their LPs 
in cash, or they can distribute shares to their LPs directly. These distributions have several features 
that make them an interesting testing ground for an examination of the impact of transactions by 
informed insiders on securities prices; they are not considered to be “sales”, and are therefore 
exempt from the antifraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the securities laws.  
There have been developed three hypotheses about why stock prices fall after a distribution in kind 
by venture capital organizations: (1) the corporate control hypothesis, (2) the liquidity hypothesis, 
and (3) the insider trading hypothesis. (1) When the venture capital organization declares a 
distribution, an active, large-block shareholder is essentially dissolved. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
and Schleifer and Vishny (1986) have shown that large block shareholders, who are often willing to 
incur the costs of monitoring management, can play an important role in increasing firm value. The 
unanticipated dissolution of a large block holding provides one alternative explanation for stock price 
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declines at the time of the distribution. (2) A large block of shares may trade at a lower price because 
the market for the company’s equity is not very liquid. If liquidity is the primary reason for price 
movements, stock prices should decline around distributions but quickly recover thereafter. (3) If the 
markets are reacting to insider trading by the venture capital organizations, distributions by more 
experienced venture capital organizations should produce more negative price reactions than 
distributions by inexperienced venture capital organizations; more experienced venture capital 
organizations should be better at monitoring than inexperienced venture capital organizations and 
should have better information about the company.  
The regression analysis shows that after increases of +7.4% in stock prices in the 60 trading days prior 
to distribution, abnormal returns during the event window (from the event to three days after the 
event) are a negative and significant -2.0%, comparable to the market reaction to publicly announced 
secondary stock sales. Distributions that occur in settings where information asymmetries may be 
greatest, where the firm has been taken public by a lower-tier underwriter and the distribution is 
soon after the IPO, have even larger immediate price declines. The results from the event window 
analysis are consistent with venture capital organizations possessing inside information and of the 
partial adjustment of the market to that information. Neither the corporate control hypothesis nor 
the liquidity hypothesis receives much support from the regression results.  
The magnitudes of price movements may be biased by cumulating abnormal returns over long 
horizons, so it could be informative to look at longer time horizons instead of just the event window. 
Using the nominal buy-and-hold returns for the firms from twelve calendar months prior to 
distributions to twelve months after distributions, returns increase sharply starting four months prior 
to the distribution. From the month after the distribution to month +8, nominal returns are quite 
modest. The pre-distribution run-up is not biased upwards by first-day returns of IPOs. Venture-
backed firms, like other IPOs, are typically underpriced and gain on average 8.4 percent on their first 
day (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens 1990). If prices fully reacted to the informational 
content of the distribution, long-run excess returns should be zero on average in the months after 
the distribution. If the market underreacts or it takes time to learn that the venture capital 
organization has distributed shares, then long-run drifts in prices may occur. Using market-adjusted 
returns, the distribution shares lose 5.4% of their value in the next year. The use of portfolios 
matched by book-to-market, size or industry groupings as a benchmark, however, leads to positive 
excess returns. Furthermore, long-run excess returns are positively correlated with underwriter rank, 
just as in the analysis of abnormal returns in the event window, and sorting firms based on valuation 
at the close of the first trading day reveals that smaller firms have lower returns than their larger 
counterparts.  
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The event window analysis clearly supported the insider trading hypothesis, but the long-run, post-
distribution returns are more ambiguous; although the extent and significance of the market reaction 
appears to vary with the benchmark employed, at least some evidence suggests that the market 
does not fully incorporate information at the time of the distribution.  
7.3.6 The Performance of Venture-Backed Offerings 
One of the central puzzles of finance – documented by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) – 
is the severe underperformance of companies after their first IPOs during the past twenty years. 
These findings suggest that investors may systematically be too optimistic about the prospects of 
firms that are issuing equity for the first time. Recent work has shown that underperformance 
extends to other countries as well as to seasoned equity offerings (i.e. secondary offerings).  
If venture capital backed firms are better on average than non-venture capital backed firms, the 
market should incorporate these expectations into the price of the IPO and long-run stock price 
performance should be similar for the two groups. Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990) 
and Megginson and Weiss (1991) find evidence that markets react favorably to the presence of 
venture capital financing at the time of an IPO. If the market underestimates the importance of a 
venture capital organization in the pricing of new issues, long-run stock price performance may 
differ.  
Gompers and Lerner found that the underperformance of IPOs documented by Ritter (1991) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) comes primarily from small, non-venture capital backed IPOs. Returns on 
non-venture capital backed IPOs are significantly below those of venture capital backed IPOs and 
below relevant benchmarks when returns are weighted equally. There are several reasons why the 
presence of venture capital may affect a stock’s long run price movements after its IPO. (1) venture 
capital organizations have contacts with top-tier, national investment banks and may be able to 
entice more and higher quality analysts to follow their firms, thus lowering potential information 
asymmetries. (2) Because institutional investors are the primary source of capital for venture capital 
funds, institutions may be more willing to hold equity in firms that have been taken public by venture 
capital organizations with whom they have invested. (3) The greater availability of information and 
the higher institutional shareholding may make venture capital-backed companies’ prices less 
susceptible to investor sentiment. (4) Seeing as venture capital organizations repeatedly bring firms 
public they may be less willing to hype a stock or overprice it, because if they become associated 
with failures in the public market they may tarnish their reputation and ability to bring firms public in 
the future. 
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To test the robustness of the results IPO performance was tested against several broad market 
indexes, Fama-French industry portfolios, and matched size and book-to-market portfolios. 
Differences in performance among groups of firms and the level of underperformance were reduced 
once returns were value-weighted. Furthermore, underperformance documented by Loughran and 
Ritter is not unique to firms issuing equity; removing IPOs and SEOs from size and book-to-market 
portfolios demonstrates that IPOs perform no worse than similar non-issuing firms. This suggests 
that we should look more broadly at types of firms that underperform and not treat IPO firms as a 
separate group.  
The underperformance of small, low book-to-market firms may have various explanations. (1) 
Unexpected shocks may particularly have hurt small growth companies in the early and mid-1980s. 
The correlation of returns in calendar time may argue in favor of this explanation. Fama and French 
(1995) show that the earnings of small firms declined in the early 1980s recession but did not recover 
when those of large firms did. It is possible that small growth firms were constrained either in capital 
or product markets after the recession, which is an argument for not viewing each IPO as an 
independent event, and that correcting for cross-sectional correlation is critical. (2) Investor 
sentiment may impact small, growth firms relatively more. The evidence from the Fama-French three 
factor model with and without the change in closed-end fund discount supports this alternative (the 
closed-end fund discount was used as a proxy for investor sentiment – decreasing average discounts 
imply that investors are more optimistic and should be correlated with higher returns for small 
issuers). The equity of small, growth firms are held primarily by individuals, who are more likely to be 
subject to fads. Asymmetric information is also likely to be more prevalent for small firms. Individuals 
spend considerably less time tracking returns than institutional investors. (3) Small non-venture 
capital backed firms go public with lower tier underwriters than similar venture capital backed firms, 
and they may have fewer and lower quality analysts following the firm after the IPO and therefore be 
subject to more information asymmetry. Michaely and Shaw (1991) provide evidence that 
underwriter reputation is positively related to the long-run performance of IPOs. It might not pay for 
sophisticated investors to research a small firm because they cannot recoup the costs of information 
gathering and trading; the absolute return that investors can make is small because the dollar size of 
the stake they can take is limited by firm size. (4) Individuals might derive utility form buying the 
shares of small, low book-to-market firms because they value them like a lottery ticket; returns on 
small non-venture capital backed IPO firms are more highly skewed than returns on either large IPO 
firms or similar sized venture capital backed IPO firms.  
To conclude, small non-venture capital backed IPOs perform significantly worse than similar venture 
capital backed IPOs, which indicates that investors are systematically too optimistic about the future 
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prospects of small non-venture capital backed IPO firms. Although, the results also show that IPO 
firms on average perform no worse than similar non-issuing firms, which indicates that it is the size 
and growth prospects of the firms that explains the underperformance and not whether or not they 
are IPO firms.  
What are the implications of these results? Most institutional investors will not be significantly hurt 
by investing in IPOs because they usually do not buy the small issues that perform worst. 
Furthermore, underperformance of small, growth companies may impact capital allocation 
negatively, because if the cost of capital for small, growth companies is periodically distorted, their 
investment behavior may be adversely affected. If any of these small firms are future industry 
leaders, then we should be concerned about this mispricing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
8.0.0 Venture Capital’s Impact on Economic Performance and Innovation 
 
8.1.0 Venture Capital – Driver of Innovation or Only Commercialization? 
Michael Peneder’s (2009) study “Venture capital and innovation at the firm level” aims at identifying 
the impact of venture capital on economic performance and innovation. He refers to three possible 
transmission mechanisms (or functions) through which venture capital has an impact on economic 
performance: (1) the financing function, (2) the selection function, and (3) the value adding function. 
(1) In the financing function, venture capital provides basic access to external capital to firms that 
would otherwise not have access to financial markets. This function refers to venture capital as a 
financial intermediary, similar to banks and pension funds, only with specialized capital to serve 
startup, high-risk, growth firms. (2) The selection function refers to the extensive due diligence 
venture capital funds perform on their prospective investments before they select which firms to 
invest their capital in. The purpose of the due diligence is to ensure that they allocate their scarce 
resources to the most promising firms. (3) The value adding function assumes that venture capital 
has a causal impact on their portfolio firms’ performance, thereby increasing their probability of 
success and their value beyond the financing and selection functions. This is based on the fact that 
venture capital funds provide more than just capital to their firms, they also provide managerial 
expertise and experience, professional business models, and access to informal business networks.  
After building a suitable database of firms, Peneder performed a survey on the group of firms 
receiving venture capital and the control group of firms not receiving venture capital about their 
motives for choosing venture capital and opting out of venture capital respectively. The empirical 
results of the survey clearly supported the financing function; a large fraction of firms receiving 
venture capital either had no other alternative sources of capital, or their sources were insufficient to 
fully finance their projects. In addition, the managers of about a third of these firms responded that 
the (continued) existence of their firm would not have been possible without venture capital. In 
contrast, a large majority of the firms not receiving venture capital responded that they had 
sufficient self-financing or loans to fully finance their projects. The survey also asked the managers of 
the venture capital backed firms how their firm’s activities changed as a result of the venture capital 
backing. Financial management was named the most important area of change, followed by three 
typical growth strategies; expanding the variety (‘diversification’) of existing products, expanding the 
geographical sales area (‘internationalization’) of existing products, and introducing new goods and 
services (‘product innovation’).  
Peneder found that venture capital financed firms were on average more innovate and grew faster 
both in terms of turnover and employment than other firms, but the difficult question is whether this 
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was due to the selection function or the value adding function. This can be said in another way, it 
might be that firms that are more innovate and have more promising products are chosen for 
venture capital financing rather than venture capital financing making them more innovative and 
more promising. Peneder used the difference in means between the control group and the test 
group of the various independent variables as a measure of selection bias, and by carefully selecting 
the control group Peneder was able to make the difference in their means statistically insignificant. 
The result was that the observed difference in innovation became insignificant and he concluded that 
it must have been related to the selection function. On the other hand, the venture capital financed 
firms still showed significant higher growth in terms of turnover and employment, and Peneder thus 
concluded that there were indications of a positive value adding function in the commercialization 
process of venture capital-backed firms. The problem is that one can never be sure to have 
controlled for all selection effects, and the observed difference in performance can still be the result 
of one or more unobserved variables.  
Kortum and Lerner (2000) examined venture capital impact on innovation on an aggregated level 
taking advantage of a major policy change affecting the venture capital industry, namely the 
clarification to the “prudent man” rule in 1979, which led to a massive influx of new capital 
commitments to the venture capital industry. This type of exogenous shock should identify the 
aggregate role of venture capital, because it is unlikely to be related to the arrival of new 
entrepreneurial (technological) opportunities or a change in investors’ confidence about the future. 
They found that a dollar of venture capital appears to be three to four times more potent in 
stimulating patenting than a dollar of traditional corporate R&D.   
In contrast to Kortum and Lerner’s findings, Stuck and Weingarten (2005) found that GPs thwart 
innovation by forcing their portfolio firms to become more business oriented for three main reasons: 
firstly, GPs are not the risk takers they are often made out to be, secondly, the short life cycle of 
venture capital funds does not allow for innovations to mature, thirdly, GPs are more business 
oriented than science oriented.  
Further support to this view is given by Engel and Keilbach (2007) who found that while venture 
capital-funded firms have a higher number of patent applications than comparable firms before 
receiving venture capital; this difference vanishes after the venture capital investment is made. 
Growth rates of venture capital-funded firms, however, were still significantly larger than 
comparable non-venture capital-funded firms after the venture capital investment. They conclude 
that patents attract venture capital while venture capital backing does not improve firms’ patenting 
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output. If anything GPs seem to focus on the commercialization of existing patents and on the 
growth of invested firms.  
Further support is given to these findings by two “venture capital insiders”. Sonnek (2006), from SEB 
Venture capital, explains that “venture capitalists dislike having to finance R&D. For us to be 
interested in financing a project, most of the R&D should be in place already”. Wadhwa (2008), a 
technological entrepreneur who received venture capital, explained “we perfected our innovative 
technology long before we raised venture capital. (…) After receiving venture capital, our only focus 
was on sales and marketing”. These quotes are a strong indication that venture capital follows 
innovation, and do not make firms more innovate.  
Pere Arqué Castells (2010) studied the relationship between venture capital and innovation at the 
firm level. He, also, did not find evidence that venture capital financing spurred firm’s patenting 
activity, he did however, find that venture capital financed firms have higher sales growth rates. He, 
thus, concluded that R&D and patenting occurs prior to venture capital entry and that GPs mainly 
focus on the commercialization of already developed products. He also found one very important 
difference in subsamples of venture capital investments; early-stage investments were more 
effective at spurring sales growth rates than late-stage investments, which then indicates that it is 
better for venture capital funds to invest in early-stage firms. Armed with this new knowledge, there 
is reason to be suspicious of the historical increase in expansion and late-stage investments by 
venture capital funds shown in figure 11 for the USA, while the development in Norway has been 
much better, as shown in figure 17, with regard to these findings. In his study, Castells refers to 
several other studies on the relationship between venture capital and innovation, giving support to 
both sides of the argument.  
The conclusion is that venture capital researchers have yet to come to a consensus on whether GPs 
spur innovation or only select more innovative and promising firms.  
8.2.0 Venture Capital – Driver of Job and Revenue Growth 
As mentioned above, there are indications in empirical research that venture capital funds do not 
increase innovation, although that is still a contested issue, there seems to be consensus regarding 
venture capital fund’s ability to increase growth in jobs and revenues in the commercialization face 
of young firms. In that case, venture capital still has a very important impact on the aggregate 
economy. “Representing just 0.2 percent of U.S. gross domestic product in 2008, venture capital 
remains a relatively small asset class. Yet, the companies it funds impact America’s economy in large 
ways” (NVCA Venture Impact 5th edition). In 2008 US venture capital investments corresponded to 
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0.19% of GDP, US venture capital capital commitments corresponded to 0.20% of GDP, and US 
venture capital capital under management corresponded to 1.42% of GDP (NVCA 2010 Yearbook). 
For those modest amounts the venture capital industry’s portfolio firms achieved job growth of 1.6% 
between 2006 and 2008 compared to a total private sector job growth of only 0.2%, and they 
achieved a revenue growth of 5.3% compared to a total private sector revenue growth of 3.5% 
(NVCA Venture Impact 5th edition). The NVCA report goes on to say that the venture capital 
industry’s portfolio firms account for 12.1 million jobs, 11% of all private sector jobs and $2.9 trillion 
in revenue, 21% of all private sector revenue in the US economy. That means that each job in venture 
capital-backed firms generated on average almost twice as much in revenue as the average private 
sector job. Clearly the venture capital industry is important in driving job and revenue growth in the 
aggregate economy.  
venture capital has played an important role in building entirely new industries since the 1970s, for 
example: the biotech industry in the 1970s, the software and semiconductor industries in the 1980s, 
and online retailing in the 1990s. “Venture capital’s impact on these industries is reflected in the 
continued dominance of venture-backed companies in generating employment and revenue within 
them” (See table 2) (NVCA Venture Impact 5th Edition). The fact that venture capital-backed 
companies account for such large shares of total employment and revenue creation in these 
industries shows that venture capital has been instrumental in leading the growth in these industries.  
These industries started out as small and relatively insignificant in the aggregate economy, but 
because of their tremendous growth they have become the most important drivers of economic 
growth in the aggregate economy. Another high-tech industry in its infants today is the clean-tech 
industry, with firms developing new technologies within areas such as renewable energy, electric 
cars, recycling, and power-grid management. These firms need capital and time to realize and 
commercialize these technologies, and venture capital investments into the clean-tech industry has 
increased ten-fold, growing from a meager $ 400 million in 2004 to $ 4.1 billion in 2008, making it the 
fastest growing sector within venture capital (NVCA Venture Impact 5th edition). It seems the clean-
tech industry will become another high growth, high impact industry, with venture capital, once 
again, playing an important role.  
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Table 2 – Source: NVCA Venture Impact 5th edition 
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9.0.0 The Role of Government in the Venture Capital Industry 
 
9.1.0 Stimulating the Venture Capital Industry 
“The venture capital industry advocates for public policies that support the entrepreneur. These 
include intellectual property protection, open trade provisions, immigration support for highly-skilled 
workers and encouragement of capital formation. In these areas, government can play a vital role in 
maximizing venture capital’s impact on the economy” (NVCA Venture Impact 5th edition).   
Since venture capital investments are long-term investments with high risks, a stable and predictable 
regulatory regime is particularly important to these investors. Democracies with a strong tendency to 
see shifting ideology and policy intentions, combined with what is often slow moving bureaucracies, 
can make even the most promising innovations seem so risky that they remain unfunded. 
Governments can stimulate the venture capital industry by providing efficient and stable regulatory 
environments for entrepreneurial firms.  
Capital formation to the venture capital industry can be supported “…with a tax policy that rewards 
long-term investment and encourages calculated, entrepreneurial risk taking. Tax differentials, such 
as favorable rates for capital gains and carried interest, serve as important tools for encouraging 
investment in emerging growth companies. In our current financial system, venture capital is the only 
source of long-term, institutional funding for such companies. When government increases the tax 
burden on venture capital, however, it inhibits the flow of dollars to innovative young start-ups” 
(NVCA Venture Impact 5th edition). Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 7.3.0, Jeng and Wells 
(1997) found that the strength of the IPO market is an important factor in determining venture 
capital commitments, so that governments should also encourage a strong stock market in its efforts 
to support capital formation to the venture capital industry.  
Traditionally, many superior innovations have started out as basic research in university labs leading 
to scientific advances, which have then been commercialized through applied research projects 
backed by venture capital (NVCA Venture Impact 5th edition). Basic research is a type of research with 
almost entirely external effects, and is therefore a type of research the private sector will not engage 
in on its own. Governments can, therefore, also stimulate the venture capital industry by funding 
basic research.  
9.2.0 Government as a Venture Capital Investor 
In Castells’ (2010) study, he also sought to explain what the impact of his findings is on the structure 
of government support for innovation. If it is so that venture capital makes firms more innovative, 
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then governments can rely on and support private venture capital funds to spur innovation in the 
economy. His findings, as reported in chapter 8.1.0, do not support this hypothesis. On the other 
hand, governments can still rely on public venture capital funds to increase innovation in firms and 
projects that would otherwise not be funded by private venture capital funds. This, however, is 
contingent on two other factors; (1) a significant selection effect, and (2) a no treatment effect. The 
selection effect means that public venture capital funds should increase the equilibrium quantity of 
venture capital to the socially efficient level by investing in firms that are not profitable to private 
venture capital funds. We should, hence, observe public venture capital funds investing in inferior 
firms rather than competing for projects that are attractive to private venture capital funds. If public 
venture capital funds compete with private venture capital funds, then it will, at least partly, replace 
(crowd out) private venture capital in projects that would otherwise be funded by private venture 
capital funds. Similarly, we should also expect public venture capital funds to invest in more 
innovative firms in order to promote the creation of spillovers. The no treatment effect implies that 
once we control for selection, public venture capital funds should be equally effective as private 
venture capital funds at stimulating both firms’ innovation and sales growth rates.  
Castells only found a moderate selection effect, giving a strong indication of a crowding out effect, 
and he found a sizeable treatment effect, meaning that public venture capital funds are not as 
effective as private venture capital funds at stimulating firms’ innovation and sales growth rates after 
controlling for the selection effect.  
The policy implication is that if public venture capital funds are, for whatever reason, unable to select 
firms with higher social effects (positive externalities), and are also less efficient than private venture 
capital funds after controlling for selection effects, then the government might be better off 
investing through private venture capital funds rather than establishing public venture capital funds. 
If governments insist on investing through public venture capital funds, they have to improve their 
selection methods and efficiency. Alternatively, governments should not be engaged in venture 
capital investments at all, but merely stimulate the venture capital industry as described in the 
previous section.  
9.3.0 The Long Run Effectiveness of Government Support for Early Stage Financing 
In his 1999 paper, Josh Lerner analyzed the results of the American Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) investment program, which provided over $6 billion to small high tech firms between 
1983 and 1995.  
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Lerner identified two premises on which government support to start-ups rested on; “(i) that the 
private sector provides insufficient capital to new firms, and (ii) that the government can identify 
firms where investments will ultimately yield high social and/or private returns.” These two premises 
are the same, albeit more eloquently stated, that Castells discussed in his 2010 paper referred to in 
chapter 9.2.0.  
Lerner identified several rationales why the SBIR program may or may not have had a positive effect; 
(1) each venture capital portfolio firm must be closely scrutinized due to moral hazard being 
particularly prominent for typical venture capital portfolio firms, which costs money, venture capital 
funds prefer to make relatively large capital infusions, and the amount that firms can raise from 
individual angel investors is usually much less than the minimum financing that a venture capital fund 
would consider, small firms with the need for capital infusions between these two constraints are 
effectively unable to raise their needed level of capital; (2) “Government officials are unlikely to have 
the expertise or resources to effectively monitor entrepreneurs”, leading to money being 
squandered on less promising and unprofitable projects; (3) since institutional investors tend to 
engage in “herding”, where they make too similar investments by basically supporting “hot” sectors, 
“public investments in sectors and regions less heavily supported by venture capitalists might lead to 
superior returns, because value-creating investments in less popular areas may have been ignored”; 
(4) on the other hand, if knowledge spillovers, specialized labor markets, and the presence of critical 
intermediaries, such as venture capitalists, lawyers, and accountants, are important factors in 
facilitating successful clusters, one may expect public investments to be more successful if invested 
in the same geographical clusters as other venture capitalists. 
The results of Lerner’s study were that “SBIR awardees grew significantly faster than a matched set 
of firms over a ten-year period. The positive effects of SBIR awards were confined to firms based in 
zip codes with substantial venture capital activity.” He did not find statistically higher growth rates 
than the matched set of firms in zip codes without substantial venture capital activity. The results, 
therefore, support rationale 4 described above, and, consequently, not rationale 3.  
Lerner went on to describe some concerns regarding the SBIR program; firstly, that political 
pressures may “lead to a deterioration of the SBIR program’s effectiveness over time”; secondly, that 
the sharp increase in the size of the venture capital pool has eliminated the capital constraints faced 
by young firms, so that the basis for the SBIR’s success and the need for public support has 
disappeared; thirdly, that the results only considered private returns and that the social returns from 
the SBIR program “might be particularly large, because many of them involve very early-stage 
technologies (where spillovers to other firms may be more frequent)”, and, fifthly, “that the SBIR set-
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aside has led to a reduction in funding for academic research, which may have even greater social 
benefits”.  
9.4.0 Norwegian Government Interventions 
The Norwegian government intervenes quite actively in the market for risk capital through various 
R&D grants and tax credit schemes, through Argentum as a fund of funds investor specializing in 
private equity funds, and through Investinor as a government funded venture capital fund (see 
chapter 6.3.0 for a more detailed description of Argentum and Investinor). All of these efforts are 
aimed at increasing the funding for private firms’ R&D efforts as well as to provide risk capital for 
high potential Norwegian firms.  
Argentum, as a fund of funds investor investing through private venture capital funds, is in 
accordance with the recommendations by Castells as seen in the conclusion of chapter 9.2.0. 
Investinor, on the other hand, operates more or less as any private venture capital fund, which may 
not be the best possible solution considering the discussion in chapter 9.2.0, where Castells’ 
arguments indicate that it would be better to allow Investinor to target less profitable and more 
innovative firms than would private venture capital funds. This, Castells argues, would raise the 
equilibrium quantity of venture capital in the economy to the socially efficient level, as opposed to 
only crowding out private venture capital investments in projects that would otherwise have been 
financed by private venture capital funds.  
Investinor is also more controversial than Argentum, precisely because it operates in a way that 
makes it a competitor to private venture capital funds. The precursor to Investinor, which was 
established in 1993 under the name SNDs Egenkapitaldivisjon until it was separated from SND in 
1998 and renamed SND Invest6, was also a venture capital firm. Its investment mandate differed 
somewhat from that of Investinor in that it also incorporated some controversial political goals such 
as rural development. This probably contributed to its unpopularity with the right wing parties, and it 
ended up being sold in 2003 to a private venture capital firm under the instructions of a new right 
leaning government, which started the sales process quickly after coming into office in 2001. The 
sales process in itself became controversial; the board of directors of SND Invest wrote a letter7 to 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry advising it to reject the bids arguing that the offers were far too 
low compared to the underlying assets. The sale went ahead with an acceptance of the highest bid, 
seemingly for ideological reasons, and it was later claimed that the government forfeited one billion 
                                                             
6
 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/nhd/dok/regpubl/stmeld/20012002/stmeld-nr-22-2001-2002-
/7/9.html?id=327032 
7
 http://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Innstillinger/Stortinget/2003-2004/inns-
200304-272/7/ 
65 
 
NOK by selling SND Invest instead of breaking it up and selling the individual investments over time; 
the buyer of SND Invest did precisely that and made great profits on its acquisition of SND Invest8.  
Unlike the American SBIR investment program, where “the government receives no equity in the firm 
and does not have any ownership claim on the intellectual property that the firm develops with 
these funds” (Lerner 1996), Argentum and Investinor do provide the Norwegian government with 
equity in the firm. This has at least one clear advantage over the SBIR program; the government only 
has to raise the capital for Argentum and Investinor once and the funds can be reinvested 
indefinitely, assuming that the programs at least break even after adjusting for inflation. Investinor is 
too young to make any judgment on their results, but Argentum has, in fact, had a much higher 
annual return on its investments than the all-PE European top quartile benchmark between 2006 and 
2009 (Argentum web site), which then leads to increasingly higher funds for supporting target firms 
and sectors over time without the government having to inject more capital into the programs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 http://arkiv.sv.no/partiet/stortingsgruppen/kontroll/regnskap/dbaFile61690.html 
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Part 3: An Empirical Study on the Additionality of Venture Capital on 
Total R&D in Norway 
 
The hypothesis related to this empirical study is that firms receiving venture capital have a tendency 
to also receive other types of external capital, that there is an additionality effect of venture capital 
on total R&D. This is an interesting research question because if the hypothesis is correct it means 
that there is an indication of a causal relationship between receiving venture capital and receiving 
other types of external capital. Since venture capital funds are particularly focused on performing 
thorough due diligence before selecting their target firms, it seems intuitive to assume that their 
approval of a firm might have a trigger effect on other types of investors who’s process of due 
diligence is simpler and more superficial. Other investors and financial intermediaries may therefore 
be influenced by a venture capital fund’s approval of a firm when making their own investment 
decisions.  
 
10.0.0 The Data 
 
The basis for this study is an annual R&D survey by Statistics Norway (SSB), which means that the 
data from the survey translates into longitudinal data, also called panel data; “Longitudinal research: 
a study involving data collection at several periods in time which enables trends over time to be 
examined. “ (Alan Wilson 2003 – Marketing Research An integrated approach). Statistics Norway 
(SSB) performs an R&D survey of all firms with at least 50 employees and all firms with 10-49 
employees which reported R&D activity in the previous year’s survey. Among all other firms with 10-
49 employees a random selection decides which firms are included in the survey, and the selection 
percentage is normally 35%. In 2006 and 2008, also firms with 5-9 employees were included in the 
survey. The sample size, thus, varies between 5000 and 6800. Participation percentage is about 95%, 
and of those who respond, about 5-10% of the survey questions are unanswered, but these are 
corrected through a review process. The survey asks questions about R&D personnel, R&D expenses, 
R&D financing, types of R&D projects, R&D project partners, etc. The survey also asks non R&D 
related questions such as turnover, export revenues, number of employees, and so on. Since 2001, 
they began including a separate question about the amount of venture capital financing, which will 
be the basis for this empirical study. The dataset then becomes a panel dataset of the survey answers 
from 2001 until 2008. The panel dataset is unbalanced, which means it has missing years for at least 
some cross-sectional units (firms) in the sample.  
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The total number of firm year observations in the sample is 37 193 spanning years 2001-2008.  The 
total number of firm year observations where the firm has at some point in time received venture 
capital (venture capital firms) is 903, where the number of firm year observations prior to the firm 
receiving venture capital is 376 and the number of firm year observations after the firm received 
venture capital is 527, which also means that the number of firm year observations where the firm 
has never received venture capital (non-venture capital firms) is 36 290. Since the sample is an 
unbalanced panel dataset, all variables have not been measured in every year, which means that the 
number of observations for any given variable may be less than 903 for venture capital firms and 36 
290 for non-venture capital firms. The table below shows the number of firm year observations 
relative to the number of employees:  
 
Table 3 
All variables noted in money terms have been deflated in one of two ways; (1) all non-R&D related 
variables have been deflated using the Norwegian Consumer Price Index9; (2) and all R&D related 
variables have been deflated using a custom-made price Index. This price index was based on the 
R&D costs reported by Forskningsrådet10 (the Norwegian research council) and weighted according 
to the data used in this study.  
One clarification may be needed before reporting the results, venture capital financing in this survey 
was defined as venture capital specifically used to finance R&D, which means that some firms may 
have received venture capital without reporting it as part of its R&D financing, in which case they 
would have been categorized as non-venture capital firms. Further problems regarding this question 
will be raised in chapter 11.1.3 about construct validity.  
                                                             
9 http://www.ssb.no/kpi/tab-01.html  
10 http://www.forskningsradet.no/servlet/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1224698192993&pagename=indikatorrapporten%2FHovedsidemal  
if VC at some point in time Total No Yes
no or missing employees -         -         -   
1-9 employees 3 152     3 103     49     
10-19 employees 10 305  10 031   274   
20-49 employees 8 952     8 706     246   
50-99 employees 6 668     6 524     144   
100-199 employees 4 230     4 162     68     
200-499 employees 2 442     2 378     64     
500-999 employees 900        851        49     
1000 employees or more 544        535        9       
Total 37 193  36 290   903   
Firm year observations
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Another potential problem is measurement errors; when using an FE regression model, a 
measurement error has a relatively greater impact than it does when using an OLS model. This is 
because the FE method bases its regression on deviations from the firm average, while the OLS 
method bases the regression on absolute values (or deviations from zero if you will). A measurement 
error’s share of the total deviation is greater when it is measured from the average than when it is 
measured from zero, since the measurement error is the same in absolute terms independent of 
which method is being used. The consequence of measurement error in independent variables is that 
the coefficients become biased towards zero, i.e. are “drawn” towards zero. Measurement error in 
the dependent variable, on the other hand, is not a threat when using the FE method because the 
measurement errors simply end up in the error term. The potential for measurement error is 
affected by the construct validity, which will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 11.1.3.  
10.1.0 Descriptive Statistics – Tests of Difference 
It is interesting to first look at whether there are significant differences between firms receiving 
venture capital and firms not receiving venture capital. Differences were measured both at their 
means and their medians for a large number of variables. Both means and medians were tested for 
differences to make the comparisons more robust. To test for differences in means, the two sample 
t-test with equal variances was applied, and to test for differences in medians the non-parametric 
equality of medians test with a chi-squared test statistic was applied. These tests were used to test 
differences in means and medians between (A) firms that received venture capital at some point in 
time (venture capital firms) and (B) firms that never received venture capital, and the difference in 
mean and median between (C) venture capital firms after receiving venture capital and (D) venture 
capital firms prior to receiving venture capital. Table 4 shows the results.  
10.1.1 Industry 
Given what is known from previous research about what types of firms venture capital funds tend to 
invest in as well as the theory about venture capital, one would expect to see systematic differences 
in terms of industries between venture capital firms (A) and non-venture capital firms (B), and that is 
exactly what the data shows. Firms were separated into a total of six industries; Telecom; 
Pharmaceuticals; IT; Biotech; Machinery; and other industries (see variables 63-68 in table 4).  
The most striking result is that almost ¼ of all venture capital firms (A) belong to the IT industry, a 
much higher frequency than the average for non-venture capital firms (B), which was expected (see 
variable 66 in table 4). Furthermore, venture capital firms (A) more often belong to the machinery 
industry than do non-venture capital firms (B), which can possibly be explained by a large oil service 
sector in Norway where many firms introduce technological improvements, some having the 
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potential to be disruptive technologies, which is attractive to venture capital funds (see variable 68 in 
table 4). Venture capital firms (A) tend also to belong more often to the telecom, pharmaceuticals, 
and biotech industries, although the differences here are small (see variables 64, 65, and 67 in table 
4). Consequently, venture capital firms (A) far less often belong to other industries than do non-
venture capital firms (B) (see variable 63 in table 4). All differences were significant at the 1% 
significance level measured both at their means and their medians, except for the difference in the 
biotech industry, which was only significant at the 5% significance level measured both at their 
means and their medians.  
10.1.2 Size and Growth 
Size and growth of the firms were measured in two ways, the number of employees and firm 
revenues. A total of nine variables were tested; the size in terms of the number of employees; and in 
terms of firm revenues; whether the firm had average annual revenues below the 20th percentile; 
between the 20th and 40th percentiles; between the 40th and 60th percentiles; between the 60th and 
80th percentiles; or higher than the 80th percentiles. The growth was measured in terms of the 
number of employees and in terms of firm revenues (see variables 1-4, and 69-73 in table 4).  
The results show that there does not seem to be a strong difference in firm size between venture 
capital firms (A) and non-venture capital firms (B) based on revenues. A significant difference in size 
only showed up, favoring non-venture capital firms (B), when testing for differences in firm revenues 
measured at their medians with a 5% significance level, while no significant difference was found 
measured at their means (see variable 3 in table 4). Also, no significant difference was found when 
testing for difference in the number of employees measured at the means or their medians (see 
variable 1 in table 4). On the other hand, when testing for differences in the size groups two 
important differences showed up; venture capital firms (A) tend to belong more frequently to the 
smallest group (see variable 69 in table 4), and less frequently to the largest group (see variable 73 in 
table 4). These differences were not very large, but they were all significant at the 1% significance 
level measured both at their means and their medians. For the three size groups in between, no 
significant differences were found (see variables 70-72 in table 4).  
The conclusion is that, although there are no large differences in size between venture capital firms 
(A) and non-venture capital firms (B), the differences are significant and the direction of the 
differences is as expected. What is surprising is how small the differences are.  
When considering the difference in size between venture capital firms after receiving venture capital 
(C) and venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital (D) a surprising result shows up; it 
appears that venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) have lower firm revenues than 
70 
 
do venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital (D), and the difference is quite large and 
significant at the 5% significance level when measured at their medians, while no significant 
difference was found measured at their means (see variable 3 in table 4). The findings are supported 
by the test of difference in the number of employees, which shows that venture capital firms after 
receiving venture capital (C) have quite a lower number of employees than do venture capital firms 
prior to receiving venture capital (D), but this time the difference was significant at the 5% 
significance level measured at their means, while no significant difference was found measured at 
their medians (see variable 1 in table 4).  
It is highly surprising to find that firms appears to be smaller both in terms of employees and 
revenues after receiving venture capital, given that previous research has concluded that venture 
capital funds tend to focus on the commercialization processes of its portfolio firms, which should at 
least have led to higher firm revenues.  
In terms of firm growth, the picture is ambiguous. The results show that when testing for differences 
in growth in employment, venture capital firms (A) tend to grow about twice as fast as non-venture 
capital firms (B), measured at their means, with a significance level of 5%, but no significant 
difference was found when testing for differences in their medians (see variable 2 in table 4). This 
suggests that the difference in growth is driven by a few outliers. On the other hand, when testing for 
differences in growth in firm revenues, the results show that venture capital firms (A) tend to grow 
almost twice as fast as non-venture capital firms (B), measured at their medians, with a significance 
level of 1%, but, this time, no significant difference was found when testing for differences in their 
means (see variable 4 in table 4).  
These results give some, albeit ambiguous, support to the hypothesis that venture capital firms grow 
faster than non-venture capital firms, presumably because venture capital funds tend to focus on the 
commercialization and professionalization processes of its portfolio firms.  
Furthermore, the results also show that venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) tend 
to grow much faster than venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital (D) when 
considering growth in revenues, although it was only significant at a 1% significance level when 
testing for differences in their medians (see variable 4 in table 4), and no significant difference was 
found when considering growth in employees (see variable 2 in table 4).  
This result gives some support to the hypothesis that venture capital funds focus on 
commercialization and professionalization, and consequently improve on their portfolio firms’ 
growth and operations.  
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10.1.3 Export Orientation 
Differences in firms’ export orientation was tested in two ways, by looking at differences in export 
revenues, and by looking at what markets the firms sell to. Furthermore, the survey also asked which 
of these markets were of greatest importance to the firm. A total of 12 variables were tested; 
whether or not the firm had exports; export revenues; export ratio measured as export revenues 
relative to total revenues; whether the firm had high export ratio, i.e. firms with an export ratio 
higher than the median observation of export ratio; whether the firm sold to the region in Norway 
where the firm was located; to other regions in Norway; to other parts of Europe; or to other parts of 
the world; whether the firm responded that the region in Norway where the firm was located was 
the most important market; if other regions in Norway was most important; if other parts of Europe 
was most important; or if other parts of the world was most important (see variables 5-16 in table 4).  
Firstly, the results show that venture capital firms (A) had a greater tendency to have exports than 
did non-venture capital firms (B), where the difference was significant at the 1% significance level 
both measured at their means and their medians (see variable 5 in table 4). In terms of the amount 
of export revenues, there was no significant difference measured at their means, but venture capital 
firms (A) had higher export revenues measured at their medians than did non-venture capital firms 
(B), which was significant at the 1% significance level (see variable 6 in table 4). Export revenues, 
however, is influenced by the size of the firm as measured by the total revenues, so that larger firms 
are expected to have, on average, larger export revenues whether or not they are venture capital 
firms. The ratio of export revenues to total revenues, on the other hand, supported that result, 
where the difference measured at their medians was significant at the 1% significance level, but no 
significant difference was found when measured at their means (see variable 7 in table 4). By testing 
whether there was a difference between the two groups in terms of whether or not they had a high 
degree of export orientation, the results show that venture capital firms (A) more often tend to have 
a high degree of export orientation, where the differences became significant at the 1% level 
measured both at their means and their medians (see variable 8 in table 4).  
There appears to be strong evidence that venture capital firms (A) have a higher degree of exports 
than do non-venture capital firms (B).  
With regards to which markets the firms sell to, the results show that venture capital firms (A) have a 
much lower focus on their local region, and a much higher focus on all other regions than do non-
venture capital firms (B). The differences were all large and significant at the 1% significance level 
(except for one in which the medians test failed in Stata) (see variables 9, 10, 11, and 12 in table 4). 
With regards to which of these markets were of greatest importance to the firm, once again, the 
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results are unambiguous; the local region is frequently of less importance to venture capital firms (A) 
and all the other regions are frequently of greater importance to venture capital firms (A) compared 
to non-venture capital firms (B), and the difference is particularly prominent for other parts of the 
world. The differences for the local region, other parts of Europe, and other parts of the world were 
all large and significant at the 1% significance level measured both at their means and their medians, 
while the difference for other regions in Norway was relatively little and only significant at the 10% 
significance level (see variables 13, 14, 15, and 16 in table 4).  
10.1.4 R&D Financing 
Differences in R&D financing were measured using four variables; whether or not the firms received 
public financing; the amount of public financing; private financing; and total financing (see variables 
25-29 in table 4).  
The results show that venture capital firms (A) tend to spend almost three times as much on R&D 
compared to non-venture capital firms (B) when measuring differences at their medians, which was 
significant at the 1% significance level, while no significant difference was found measured at their 
means (see variable 25 in table 4). When considering a breakdown between private and public 
financing, the results show that venture capital firms (A) tend to receive public financing more often 
than do non-venture capital firms (B), where the difference measured both at their means and their 
medians had a 1% significance level (see variable 27 in table 4). In terms of the amount of public 
financing there was a small difference measured at their medians with a 1% significance level 
indicating that venture capital firms (A) also tend to receive more public financing than do non-
venture capital firms (B), although the evidence for this is weak given that no significant difference 
was found measured at their means (see variable 28 in table 4). The same was true of private 
financing, where a huge difference was found measured at their medians with a 1% significance level, 
indicating that venture capital firms (A) tend to also receive more private financing than do non-
venture capital firms (B), although the evidence for this is weak since no significant difference was 
found measured at their means (see variable 29 in table 4).  
When focusing on the difference between venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) 
and venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital (D), the results show that venture capital 
firms after receiving venture capital (C) tend to spend a little more on R&D compared to venture 
capital firms prior to receiving venture capital (D) when measuring the difference at their medians, 
which was significant at the 5% significance level, but no significant difference was found when 
measuring their means (see variable 25 in table 4). Considering the breakdown between private and 
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public financing, however, no significant difference was found for neither (see variables 27-29 in 
table 4).  
10.1.5 R&D Intensity 
R&D intensity was measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to firm revenues. Differences were tested 
along two variables; the R&D intensity; and the ratio of firms with high R&D intensity, i.e. firms with 
R&D intensity higher than the mean R&D intensity across all firms in the sample (see variables 45 and 
46 in table 4).  
The results show a stark difference between venture capital firms (A) and non-venture capital firms 
(B) in terms of R&D intensity; in fact, venture capital firms (A) spent on average more than 6 times 
their revenues on R&D, while the corresponding number for non-venture capital firms (B) is about 
half of their revenues. Of course, averages can be highly distorted by a few very large observations, 
so in this case, it is probably more informative to compare their medians, in which case, the numbers 
are in the few percentage points, which is a far more reasonable figure to consider. Even when 
comparing medians, venture capital firms’ (A) R&D spending was still more than 5 times higher than 
that of non-venture capital firms (B) relative to their revenues (see variable 45 in table 4). 
Furthermore, the results show, not surprisingly, that venture capital firms (A), to a much greater 
extent, belong to the high R&D intensity group than do non-venture capital firms (B) (see variable 46 
in table 4). The differences were all significant at the 1% significance level measured both at their 
means and their medians.  
What is even more interesting and somewhat surprising, given that former research has concluded 
that venture capital funds tend to focus on the commercialization process, is that venture capital 
firms have a far higher R&D intensity after receiving venture capital (C) than before they receive 
venture capital (D). The differences are huge even when measured at their medians, and are 
significant at the 5% and 1% significance level for means and medians respectively (see variable 45in 
table 4). When considering the second variable, the ratio of venture capital firms with high R&D 
intensity is also far higher for venture capital firms after they receive venture capital (C) compared to 
venture capital firms before they receive venture capital (D), which was significant at the 1% 
significance level when measured both at their means and their medians (see variable 46 in table 4).  
These somewhat surprising results can be explained technically by the findings in chapter 10.1.4 
showing that venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) tend to spend slightly more on 
R&D in absolute terms, while at the same time the findings in chapter 10.1.2 showed that venture 
capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) tend to have lower revenues compared to venture 
capital firms prior to receiving venture capital (D).  
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10.1.6 R&D Personnel 
Although the differences between the two groups in terms of R&D personnel were not very large, 
they were, on the other hand, highly significant. Five variables were used to test for differences in 
R&D personnel; their ratio of R&D personnel with PhDs; their ratio of R&D personnel with higher 
education excl. PhDs; their ratio of R&D personnel with higher education incl. PhDs; their ratio of 
R&D personnel without higher education; and the ratio of firms with advanced R&D, i.e. firms with a 
ratio of R&D personnel with PhDs higher than the median observation of the ratio of R&D personnel 
with PhDs. Although this last measure is surely crude, it should be a strong indication of how 
advanced the R&D is (see variables 32-36 in table 4).  
The results are unambiguous; venture capital firms (A) tend to have a higher ratio of R&D personnel 
with PhDs and other higher education backgrounds, and lower ratio of R&D personnel without higher 
education backgrounds than do non-venture capital firms (B). The differences were all significant at 
the 1% significance level, except for the ratio of R&D personnel with higher education excl. PhDs 
where the difference measured at their medians was significant at the 5% significance level (see 
variables 32-35 in table 4). The last variable regarding advanced R&D showed a fairly large difference, 
with a significance level of 1%, measured both at their means and their medians, indicating that 
venture capital firms (A) have a strong tendency to perform more advanced R&D compared to non-
venture capital firms (B) (see variable 36 in table 4).  
10.1.7 R&D Cooperation 
Firms can choose to do their internal R&D alone or in cooperation with other entities, such as other 
firms, consultants, universities, etc. Two variables related to R&D cooperation were tested; whether 
or not they had cooperation projects; and the ratio of R&D expenses related to cooperation projects 
relative to total R&D expenses (see variable 19 and 20 in table 4).  
With regards to whether or not the firms had R&D cooperation projects, the results show that 
venture capital firms (A) more often tend to be involved in such projects than do non-venture capital 
firms (B), where the difference measured both at their means and their medians had a 1% 
significance level (see variable 19 in table 4). The results also show that that venture capital-firms (A) 
tend to have a higher ratio of R&D expenses related to R&D cooperation projects compared to non-
venture capital firms (B), where the difference was significant at the 1% significance level measured 
at their medians, although the evidence for this is weak considering that no significant difference was 
found measured at their means (see variable 20 in table 4).  
Considering a breakdown of R&D cooperation into types of R&D cooperation partners, the results 
show that there is a tendency for venture capital firms (A) to slightly more frequently partner up with 
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Universities in R&D cooperation projects more often than do non-venture capital firms (B), where the 
difference was significant at the 10% significance level measured at their means and 1% measured at 
their medians (see variable 21 in table 4). No significant differences were found between the two 
groups regarding partnerships with R&D firm, lab or institution or with entities within the same 
corporation (see variables 22 and 23 in table 4). Furthermore, the results show that venture capital 
firms (A) tend slightly less frequently to partner up with other types of partners compared to non-
venture capital firms (B), where the difference was significant at the 5% significance level measured 
at their means (the medians test failed in Stata) (see variable 24 in table 4).  
The results also show that venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) tend far less often 
to partner up with R&D firm, lab, or institution than do venture capital firms prior to receiving 
venture capital (D), where the difference was significant at the 1% significance level measured at 
their means (the medians test failed in Stata) (see variable 22 in table 4). No significant differences 
were found between these two groups regarding the other variables (see variables 19, 20, 21, 23 and 
24 in table 4).   
10.1.8 Types of R&D 
Types of R&D were distinguished in two different ways; (1) by considering whether the R&D was 
product or process related; or (2) by considering whether it was basic research, applied research, or 
development. A total of eleven variables were tested; whether or not the firms had product related 
R&D; or process related R&D; how much as a percentage of total was spent on product related R&D; 
or process related R&D; whether or not the firms had basic research; applied research; or 
development; and how much as a percentage of total R&D expenses was spent on basic research; on 
applied research; or on development; and lastly, whether the firm had a high percentage of R&D 
expenses engaged in development, i.e. a higher percentage of R&D expenses than the mean 
observation of percentages (see variables 47-57 in table 4).  
Firstly, regarding the first category of R&D types (1), the results show a weak tendency for venture 
capital firms (A) to have product related R&D more frequently than do non-venture capital firms (B), 
but it was only significant at the 10% significance level when measured at their means (the medians 
test failed in Stata), and no significant difference between the two groups was found when 
considering process related R&D (see variables 47 and 48 in table 4). In terms of the percentage of 
R&D expenses going to product or process related R&D, no significant differences were found 
between venture capital firms (A) and non-venture capital firms (B), although it might be worth 
noticing that about 75% of R&D expenses went to product related R&D and only 25% to process 
related R&D (see variables 49 and 50 in table 4). 
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What is interesting is that venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) tend to have 
product related R&D more frequently and process related R&D less frequently compared to venture 
capital firms prior to receiving venture capital (D), where both differences were significant at a 5% 
significance level measured at their means (the medians test for both groups failed in Stata) (see 
variables 47 and 48 in table 4). Also, venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) tend to 
have a greater percentage of R&D expenses going to product related R&D and a lower percentage 
going to process related R&D compared to venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital (D), 
where the differences measured at their means were significant at a 1% significance level for both 
product and process related R&D, while the differences measured at their medians were significant 
at the 10% and 5% significance level for product and process related R&D respectively (see variables 
49 and 50 in table 4).  
One interpretation of these results is that when venture capital funds get engaged with a firm, they 
tend to shift the focus more towards product related R&D projects within the firm, presumably 
because these types of projects have better prospects for profitable commercialization than process 
related R&D projects.  
Secondly, regarding the second category (2) of R&D types, the results show that venture capital firms 
(A) tend to have a slightly higher frequency of basic research than do non-venture capital firms (B), 
where the difference was significant at the 5% significance level measured both at their means and 
their medians (see variable 51 in table 4). Furthermore, venture capital firms (A) tend to have a 
higher frequency of applied research than do non-venture capital firms (B), where the difference was 
significant at the 1% significance level measured both at their means and their medians (see variable 
52 in table 4). Lastly, the results show no significant difference between the two groups when testing 
for differences in their frequency to perform development measured at their means or at their 
medians (see variable 53 in table 4). In terms of the percentage of R&D expenses being spent on the 
three types of R&D, the results show that venture capital firms (A) tend to spend a much higher 
percentage on basic research, albeit from a low base, compared to non-venture capital firms (B), 
where the difference was significant at the 1% significance level measured at their means and the 5% 
significance level measured at their medians (see variable 54 in table 4). Furthermore, venture capital 
firms (A) also tend to spend a slightly higher percentage on applied research than do non-venture 
capital firms (B), where the difference was significant at the 1% significance level measured both at 
their means and their medians (see variable 55 in table 4). This means, as the results also show, that 
venture capital firms (A) tend to spend a lower percentage on development than do non-venture 
capital firms (B), where the difference was significant at the 1% level measured at their means (the 
medians test failed in Stata) (see variable 56 in table 4). Not surprisingly then, do the results show 
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that venture capital firms (A) tend much less frequently to have a high percentage of R&D expenses 
engaged in development than do non-venture capital firms (B), where the difference was significant 
at the 1% significance level measured both at their means and their medians (see variable 57 in table 
4).  
These results are very surprising given the notion that venture capital funds tend to focus on the 
commercialization processes and tend to invest in firms that will succeed commercially within a few 
years. If that was the case, then one would expect to see venture capital funds have a greater 
emphasis on development as opposed to basic or applied research, but the results show the exact 
opposite. This may, at least partly, be explained by the results in chapter 10.1.7 which showed that 
venture capital firms (A) tend slightly more frequently to partner up with Universities in R&D 
cooperation projects, and Universities perform more basic research.  
10.1.9 Types of Innovations 
Closely related to the previous paragraph is the question of whether the firms have introduced new 
or improved products or processes (see variable 58 and 59 in table 4).  
The results show that venture capital firms (A) tend much more frequently to have introduced new 
or improved products and slightly less frequently to have introduce new or improved processes 
compared to non-venture capital firms (B), where the differences were significant at the 1% 
significance level and the 5% significance level measured at their means for products and processes 
respectively (the medians test failed in Stata) (see variables 58 and 59 in table 4).  
The results also show that venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) tend much more 
frequently to have introduced new or improved products than do venture capital firms prior to 
receiving venture capital (D), where the difference was significant at the 5% significance level 
measured at their means (the medians test failed in Stata) (see variable 58 in table 4). No significant 
difference was found when comparing their frequency to introduce new or improved processes (see 
variable 59 in table 4).  
These results support the hypothesis that venture capital firms focus on the commercialization 
processes and invest in firms with a great potential for commercial success. The results may also 
indicate that venture capital funds are better at commercializing and introducing, new or improved 
products than they are at commercializing and introducing new or improved processes.  
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10.1.10 Types of Obstructions to Innovation 
The dataset include three variables related to obstructions to firms’ innovation efforts; whether a 
firm experienced obstructions to its innovation efforts; if the obstruction was related to a lack of R&D 
financing; or related to other obstructions (see variable 60-62 in table 4).  
The results show that venture capital firms (A) much more frequently responded that they have 
experienced obstruction to their innovation efforts compared to non-venture capital firms (B), where 
the difference is significant at the 1% significance level measured both at their means and their 
medians (see variable 60 in table 4). More specifically, venture capital firms (A) tend much more 
frequently to respond that they have experienced obstructions to their innovations efforts due to a 
lack of financing compared to non-venture capital firms (B), where the difference is also significant at 
the 1% significance level measured both at their means and their medians (see variable 61 in table 4).  
These results are consistent with the findings by Michael Peneder (2009), who found that one of the 
motivations for venture capital firms to have accepted venture capital was their lack of access to 
other funding sources.  
However, this interpretation is obscured when considering the differences between venture capital 
firms after receiving venture capital (C) and venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital 
(D), which shows that venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) more frequently 
respond that their innovation efforts have been obstructed in general and also by a lack of finance 
specifically than do venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital (D), where the differences 
were significant at the 5% significance level (the medians test for the finance obstruction failed in 
Stata) (see variables 60 and 61 in table 4).  
This might indicate that venture capital funds not only focus on the commercialization processes, 
but, in fact, go so far as to obstruct further innovations after they have become investors in a 
portfolio firm; one reason for venture capital funds to do that may be to focus on the most promising 
innovations that are closest to commercialization and drop all other less promising innovation efforts 
at the reluctance of the entrepreneur. Another interpretation is that, somehow, the financing need 
increases by more than the infusion of venture capital.  
However, comparing these results to the finding in chapter 10.1.4 that venture capital firms after 
receiving venture capital (C) tend to spend slightly more on R&D in absolute terms, and the finding in 
chapter 10.1.5 that venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) tend to have a far higher 
R&D intensity compared to venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital (D) shows that 
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something strange is going on with the responses related to obstructions to innovations. More 
research is needed to understand the dynamics in this situation.  
10.1.11 Intellectual Protection 
There were a total of eight variables related to the subject of intellectual protection; one for whether 
or not the firm had deployed any initiatives to protect its innovations; protection through patenting; 
protection through trademarks; protection through secrecy; protection through copyrights; 
protection through registered designs; protection through design complexity; and protection through 
lead-time advantage (see variables 37-44 in table 4).  
First of all, the results from the tests of difference on whether or not the firms deployed protection 
initiatives showed a strong tendency for venture capital firms (A) to use intellectual protection more 
frequently compared to non-venture capital firms (B), where the difference was significant at the 1% 
significance level measured both at their means and their medians (see variable 37 in table 4). When 
considering a more detailed breakdown of intellectual protection types, the results, firstly, show no 
significant difference between the two groups, measured both at their means and their medians, 
regarding protection through copyright, registered design, or lead-time advantage (see variables 41, 
42, and 44 in table 4). Furthermore, the results show that venture capital firms (A) tend to use 
patenting more frequently than do non-venture capital firms (B), where the difference had a 1% 
significance level measured both at their means and their medians (see variable 38 in table 4). The 
results also show a weak tendency for venture capital firms (A) to use trademark protection more 
frequently, where the difference measured at their means had a 10% significance level, while no 
significant difference was found for their medians (see variable 39 in table 4). On the other hand, 
venture capital firms (A) have a strong tendency to use secrecy to protect their innovations more 
frequently than do non-venture capital firms (B), where the difference was significant at the 1% level, 
measured both at their means and their medians (see variable 40 in table 4). Lastly and rather 
surprisingly, given that the results reported in chapter 10.1.6 showed a strong tendency for venture 
capital firms to perform more advanced R&D, the results showed a very small, yet highly significant, 
tendency for non-venture capital firms (B) to use design complexity to protect their innovations more 
frequently than venture capital firms (A), where the difference was significant at the 1% significance 
level measured both at their means and their medians (see variable 43 in table 4).  
One may have expected venture capital funds to be better at protecting their intellectual property, 
because venture capital funds have a lot of experience in dealing with portfolio firms that tend to be 
technology intensive firms. However, the only variable that showed any significant difference 
between venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) and venture capital firms prior to 
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receiving venture capital (D) was the variable regarding intellectual protection through lead time 
advantage, which showed that venture capital firms after receiving venture capital (C) tend more 
frequently to use lead time advantage to protect their intellectual property, which was significant at 
the 5% significance level (see variable 44 in table 4).  
10.1.12 Summary of the Results 
A short summary of the results of the comparisons between venture capital firms and non-venture 
capital firms is that; venture capital firms tend to belong to the IT, Machinery, Telecom, 
Pharmaceuticals, and biotech industries; they tend to be somewhat smaller, but grow faster than 
non-venture capital firms; they tend to be more export oriented; they tend to receive public 
financing more often, but the evidence of venture capital firms receiving more public financing in 
monetary terms was weak; they tend to have a far higher R&D intensity; they tend to have a higher 
ratio of R&D personnel with PhDs and other higher educational backgrounds, and they tend to 
perform more advanced R&D; they tend to be involved in R&D cooperation with outsiders more 
often; they tend to have a slightly higher frequency of product related R&D as opposed to process 
related R&D, and they tend to have a slightly higher frequency of basic and applied research as 
opposed to development; they tend much more frequently to have introduced new or improved 
products, and slightly less frequently to have introduced new or improved processes compared to 
non-venture capital firms; they respond much more frequently to have experienced obstructions to 
their innovation efforts, particularly financial obstructions; and venture capital firms tend to use 
patenting, trademark protection, and secrecy to protect their innovations more frequently, but 
design complexity to protect their innovations less frequently than do non-venture capital firms.  
A similar short summary of the results of the comparisons between venture capital firms after 
receiving venture capital and venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital is that; venture 
capital firms after receiving venture capital tend to grow much faster than venture capital firms prior 
to receiving venture capital; they tend to have a much higher R&D intensity; they tend more 
frequently to have product related R&D and less frequently to have process related R&D, and they 
tend to invest a higher ratio of their total R&D expenses in product related R&D; they tend more 
frequently to have introduced new or improved products; and venture capital firms after receiving 
venture capital tend more frequently to respond that they have experienced obstructions to their 
innovation efforts than do venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital.  
One important critique of such tests of difference is that as long as there is an upward trend in the 
variable over time then significance levels will be exaggerated, potentially leading to false or 
exaggerated conclusions, but it is possible to correct for this in a regression analysis framework.  
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Table 4: Tests of difference (see subtext at the end of the table for explanations) 
 
N 903 35404 513 390
Mean 116.29 109.96 6.33 99.50 138.38 -38.88 **
Median 30 32 -2.00 28 36 -8.00
N 688 20977 459 229
Mean 5.0846 2.7654 2.3192 ** 5.1465 4.9606 0.1859
Median 2.3861 0.2907 2.0954 2.6906 2.2989 0.3917
N 903 35404 513 390
Mean 213457 380742 -167285 189273 245271 -55998
Median 36463 44065 -7602 ** 31064 45144 -14080 **
N 688 20920 459 229
Mean 14.9734 12.3789 2.5945 16.6071 11.6991 4.9080
Median 10.6176 6.4967 4.1209 *** 13.6598 4.9945 8.6653 ***
N 304 12251 129 175
Mean 0.6349 0.4383 0.1966 *** 0.6279 0.6400 -0.0121
Median 1 0 1 *** 1 1 0 (f)
N 304 12251 129 175
Mean 93261 135294 -42033 24474 143966 -119492 ***
Median 555 0 555 *** 484 808 -324
N 301 12126 128 173
Mean 0.3867 0.4118 -0.0251 0.3338 0.4259 -0.0921
Median 0.0299 0.0000 0.0299 *** 0.0299 0.0299 0.0000
N 301 12126 128 173
Mean 0.3455 0.2218 0.1237 *** 0.3438 0.3468 -0.0030
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0
N 68 1677 42 26
Mean 12.4531 -3.7292 16.1823 13.8475 10.2001 3.6474
Median 9.3406 1.9673 7.3733 14.1661 -1.1399 15.3060
N 181 7772 53 128
Mean 0.6354 0.5840 0.0514 0.6604 0.6250 0.0354
Median 1 1 0 (f) 1 1 0 (f)
N 390 15786 243 147
Mean 0.1564 0.4041 -0.2477 *** 0.1728 0.1293 0.0436
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0
N 390 15786 243 147
Mean 0.7872 0.5964 0.1908 *** 0.7778 0.8027 -0.0249
Median 1 1 0 (f) 1 1 0 (f)
N 390 15786 243 147
Mean 0.6077 0.3163 0.2914 *** 0.6255 0.5782 0.0473
Median 1 0 1 *** 1 1 0 (f)
N 390 15786 243 147
Mean 0.5077 0.2341 0.2736 *** 0.5144 0.4966 0.0178
Median 1 0 1 *** 1 0 1
N 435 16485 246 189
Mean 0.2345 0.4664 -0.2319 *** 0.2195 0.2540 -0.0345
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0
N 435 16485 246 189
Mean 0.3034 0.2635 0.0399 * 0.3171 0.2857 0.0314
Median 0 0 0 * 0 0 0
N 435 16485 246 189
Mean 0.2552 0.1737 0.0815 *** 0.2561 0.2540 0.0021
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0
N 435 16485 246 189
Mean 0.2069 0.0965 0.1104 *** 0.2073 0.2063 0.0010
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0
N 838 12144 493 345
Mean 0.4356 0.3699 0.0657 *** 0.4178 0.4609 -0.0430
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0
(A) (C)
firma_ansatte_vekst
firma_export_vekst
firma_marked_reg_D
firma_marked_EU_D
firma_viktig_reg_D
firma_viktig_EU_D
sam_D
firma_export
firma_oms_vekst
Variable
Difference
(A-B) (C-D)
Difference
firma_marked_Norge_D
firma_marked_andre_D
firma_viktig_Norge_D
firma_viktig_andre_D
(B) (D)
firma_export_andel
firma_export_høy_D
firma_konsern_D
firma_ansatte
firma_oms
firma_export_D
3
2
1
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
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N 256 3431 181 75
Mean 12.6875 11.1277 1.5598 12.6464 12.7867 -0.1403
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 365 4492 206 159
Mean 0.4767 0.4288 0.0480 * 0.4515 0.5094 -0.0580
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 1 -1
N 365 4492 206 159
Mean 0.5479 0.5456 0.0023 0.4806 0.6352 -0.1546 ***
Median 1 1 0.0000 (f) 1 1 0.0000 (f)
N 47 888 12 35
Mean 0.6383 0.6678 -0.0295 0.5833 0.6571 -0.0738
Median 1 1 0 (f) 1 1 0 (f)
N 365 4492 206 159
Mean 0.7260 0.7812 -0.0551 ** 0.7039 0.7547 -0.0508
Median 1 1 0.0000 (f) 1 1 0.0000 (f)
N 799 11590 485 314
Mean 7817.18 8463.53 -646.35 8522.68 6727.48 1795.20
Median 2838.00 1093.49 1744.51 *** 3065.69 2555.96 509.73 **
N 464 5648 341 123
Mean -2.3119 -0.2523 -2.0596 -12.2087 25.1257 -37.3344 ***
Median 0.2983 -1.5841 1.8824 -1.2589 5.5291 -6.7880
N 799 11590 485 314
Mean 0.5081 0.3399 0.1682 *** 0.5216 0.4873 0.0343
Median 1 0 1 *** 1 0 1 (f)
N 799 11590 485 314
Mean 651.05 712.28 -61.23 673.49 616.39 57.10
Median 54.28 0.00 54.28 *** 84.65 0.00 84.65
N 799 11590 485 314
Mean 7166.13 7751.25 -585.12 7849.20 6111.08 1738.12
Median 2355.96 903.53 1452.43 *** 2497.10 2023.07 474.03
N 903 13273 513 390
Mean 0.4241 0.3780 0.0462 *** 0.3899 0.4692 -0.0794 **
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0 **
N 903 13273 513 390
Mean 2264.42 2320.24 -55.82 2598.51 1824.95 773.56
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0 **
N 690 8449 409 281
Mean 5.6090 4.1458 1.4632 *** 6.5914 4.1792 2.4122 **
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 690 8449 409 281
Mean 65.8964 59.7018 6.1945 *** 65.9610 65.8024 0.1585
Median 79.7959 66.6667 13.1293 *** 80.0000 79.5918 0.4082
N 690 8449 409 281
Mean 60.2874 55.5560 4.7314 *** 59.3696 61.6232 -2.2536
Median 66.6667 59.5142 7.1525 ** 65.8986 66.6667 -0.7680
N 690 8449 409 281
Mean 34.1036 40.2982 -6.1946 *** 34.0391 34.1976 -0.1585
Median 20.2041 33.3333 -13.1293 *** 20.0000 20.4082 -0.4082
N 690 8449 409 281
Mean 0.1333 0.0924 0.0409 *** 0.1540 0.1032 0.0508 *
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0 *
N 903 13273 513 390
Mean 0.3677 0.3097 0.0580 *** 0.3762 0.3564 0.0198
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0
N 332 4110 193 139
Mean 0.4036 0.3324 0.0713 *** 0.3990 0.4101 -0.0111
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0
(A) (C)
foufin_tot_off
foufin_tot_priv
foupers_hoyutd_andel
foupers_hoymindok_andel
fouinnkj_tot
foupers_doktor_andel
protect_D
sam_andel
foufin_tot
foufin_tot_vekst
protect_patent_D
(B)
foufin_tot_off_D
FOU_avansert_D
foupers_andre_andel
fouinnkj_D
Difference
(D)
Difference
(A-B) (C-D)
20
25
26
27
28
29
30
Variable
21 samUni_D
22 samFOU_D
23 samInn_D
24 samAndre_D
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
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N 332 4110 193 139
Mean 0.4096 0.3608 0.0488 * 0.4145 0.4029 0.0116
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 332 4110 193 139
Mean 0.6325 0.5265 0.1060 *** 0.5959 0.6835 -0.0876
Median 1 1 0 *** 1 1 0
N 332 4110 193 139
Mean 0.2108 0.1883 0.0225 0.2228 0.1942 0.0286
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 332 4110 193 139
Mean 0.1476 0.1367 0.0109 0.1451 0.1511 -0.0060
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 332 4110 193 139
Mean 0.3735 0.3861 -0.0126 *** 0.3990 0.3381 0.0608
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0
N 332 4110 193 139
Mean 0.7259 0.6820 0.0439 0.7720 0.6619 0.1102 **
Median 1 1 0 1 1 0 (f)
N 887 13094 506 381
Mean 649.65 47.25 602.41 *** 953.92 245.56 708.36 **
Median 5.88 1.10 4.78 *** 9.23 3.82 5.41 ***
N 902 13252 512 390
Mean 0.2395 0.0398 0.1997 *** 0.2871 0.1769 0.1102 ***
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0 ***
N 366 4660 214 152
Mean 0.9372 0.9109 0.0262 * 0.9533 0.9145 0.0388 **
Median 1 1 0 (f) 1 1 0 (f)
N 366 4660 214 152
Mean 0.5874 0.6137 -0.0263 0.5327 0.6645 -0.1318 **
Median 1 1 0 (f) 1 1 0 (f)
N 366 4660 214 152
Mean 74.5170 72.1935 2.3235 79.0386 68.1511 10.8875 ***
Median 90.0000 85.0000 5.0000 90.0000 80.0000 10.0000 *
N 366 4660 214 152
Mean 25.4830 27.8050 -2.3220 20.9614 31.8489 -10.8875 ***
Median 10.0000 15.0000 -5.0000 10.0000 20.0000 -10.0000 **
N 366 4660 214 152
Mean 0.2158 0.1704 0.0455 ** 0.2150 0.2171 -0.0022
Median 0 0 0 ** 0 0 0
N 366 4660 214 152
Mean 0.5246 0.4217 0.1029 *** 0.5140 0.5395 -0.0255
Median 1 0 1 *** 1 1 0 (f)
N 366 4660 214 152
Mean 0.9563 0.9667 -0.0105 0.9486 0.9671 -0.0185
Median 1 1 0 (f) 1 1 0 (f)
N 366 4660 214 152
Mean 4.8550 2.9722 1.8828 *** 5.2103 4.3548 0.8554
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 366 4660 214 152
Mean 17.2957 13.8209 3.4749 *** 18.3376 15.8289 2.5087
Median 5.0000 0.0000 5.0000 *** 7.5000 5.0000 2.5000
N 366 4660 214 152
Mean 77.8493 83.2070 -5.3577 *** 76.4521 79.8162 -3.3641
Median 90.0000 100.0000 -10.0000 (f) 90.0000 90.0000 0.0000
N 828 11621 488 340
Mean 0.2222 0.4586 -0.2363 *** 0.2377 0.2000 0.0377
Median 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0
(A) (B)
Difference
(C) (D)
Difference
(A-B) (C-D)
45
46
47
48
foukost_B_anvendt
FOU_intensitet
foukost_B_grunn
foukost_A_produkt_D
FOU_intensitet_høy_D
foukost_A_prosess_D
protect_CRdesign_D
44 protect_leadtime_D
protect_TM_D
protect_CR_D
protect_designcomplex_D
foukost_B_utvikling
foukost_B_utvikling_høy_D
43
39
41
40
54
55
56
57
Variable
protect_secrecy_D
42
49 foukost_A_produkt
50 foukost_A_prosess
51 foukost_B_grunn_D
52 foukost_B_anvendt_D
53 foukost_B_utvikling_D
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Table 4 – Shows the results of tests of difference in mean and median for a number of variables. The mean difference 
test is a two sample t-test with equal variances, and the median difference test is a non-parametric equality of medians 
test based on a chi-squared test statistic. (A) Firms that have never received venture capital, (B) Firms that have, at some 
point in time, received venture capital, (C) venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital (incl. the year they 
receive venture capital), (D) venture capital firms after receiving venture capital. 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
N 386 6675 206 180
Mean 0.6451 0.5258 0.1192 *** 0.6942 0.5889 0.1053 **
Median 1 1 0 (f) 1 1 0 (f)
N 386 6675 206 180
Mean 0.7358 0.7867 -0.0509 ** 0.7233 0.7500 -0.0267
Median 1 1 0 (f) 1 1 0 (f)
N 181 7772 53 128
Mean 0.3812 0.1754 0.2058 *** 0.5094 0.3281 0.1813 **
Median 0 0 0 *** 1 0 1 **
N 486 19939 277 209
Mean 0.7510 0.4207 0.3303 *** 0.7906 0.6986 0.0920 **
Median 1 1 0 *** 1 1 0 (f)
N 486 19939 277 209
Mean 0.7140 0.4003 0.3137 *** 0.7256 0.6986 0.0270
Median 1 1 0 *** 1 1 0 (f)
N 903 35404
Mean 0.6611 0.8932 -0.2320 ***
Median 1 1 0 (f)
N 903 35404
Mean 0.0377 0.0142 0.0234 ***
Median 0 0 0 ***
N 903 35404
Mean 0.0144 0.0027 0.0117 ***
Median 0 0 0 ***
N 903 35404
Mean 0.2248 0.0668 0.1580 ***
Median 0 0 0 ***
N 903 35404
Mean 0.0111 0.0056 0.0055 **
Median 0 0 0 **
N 903 35404
Mean 0.0509 0.0175 0.0335 ***
Median 0 0 0 ***
N 903 35404
Mean 0.1650 0.1038 0.0612 ***
Median 0 0 0 ***
N 901 35232
Mean 0.1299 0.1414 -0.0115
Median 0 0 0
N 901 35232
Mean 0.1787 0.1701 0.0086
Median 0 0 0
N 901 35232
Mean 0.2087 0.2276 -0.0189
Median 0 0 0
N 901 35232
Mean 0.3196 0.3615 -0.0419 ***
Median 0 0 0 ***
(A) (B)
Difference
(C) (D)
Difference
(A-B) (C-D)
size_D2
size_D4
inno_hindret_andre_D
size_D1
size_D3
firma_næring_Farmasi_D
firma_næring_IT_D
firma_næring_Telekom_D
firma_næring_Maskin_D
firma_næring_Medisin_D
inno_hindret_finans_D
inno_ny_produkt_D
inno_hindret_D
inno_ny_prosess_D
64
65
66
Variable
firma_næring_Annet_D
size_D5
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
58
59
60
61
62
63
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10.2.0 Descriptive Statistics – Graphs 
Figure 22 shows the total R&D identified through Statistics Norway’s R&D survey. The value for 2004 
is missing, but all the other years are based on a number of observations varying from a low number 
of 854 in 2002 to a high number of 1513 in 2008. Although there are few years included in the figure, 
it clearly shows an upward sloping trend in total R&D spending in recent years (deflated).  
Figure 23, depicting total venture capital spent on R&D per year, is based on a low of 25 observations 
in 2001 and a high of 68 observations in 2008, with missing observations for 2002 and 2004. Figure 
23 also shows an upward sloping trend, but a much steeper slope, quicker increase, than total R&D 
spending.  
Figure 24 combines the two variables into a ratio of venture capital spent on R&D relative to total 
R&D spending per year. The ratio started out below 1% in 2001, and even after rising quickly still 
ended up just below 2% in 2008. Most of the R&D spending is, thus, not financed by venture capital, 
but by other sources of financing. This is based on only a few years of observations, so the interesting 
question is whether the upward sloping trend will continue in the following years, especially 
considering the financial crisis.  
Figure 25 shows how much venture capital was spent on R&D relative to total venture capital 
investments in Norway; the value for 2004 is missing. This ratio has fluctuated between a low of 
3.43% in 2007 and a high of 8.91% in 2005 (the data does not include absolutely all R&D in Norway, 
so the percentages are under-exaggerated). If a pattern can be deduced from the figure, based on 
the low number of years, it would be that the ratio seems to be varying between a floor of 3.43% and 
a ceiling of 8.91% without a clear trend saying otherwise. Based on what we know about venture 
capital funds’ investment behavior and preferences for focusing on the commercialization process, it 
might explain the low ratio and that there would logically be a ceiling to the ratio. Comparing these 
results with the estimates by Bob Zider (1998) shows that the ratios for Norway reported above are 
quite realistic. Bob Zider estimated that out of the $10 billion of venture capital investments in 1997 
less than $1 billion was spent funding R&D, i.e. a ratio of less than 10%, while more than 80% went to 
finance investments in manufacturing, marketing, and sales.  
Figure 26 shows the ratio of R&D spending relative to firm revenues. It is based on a number of 
observations ranging from a low of 847 in 2002 and a high of 1516 in 2008. The trend in this ratio is 
clearly downward sloping, and bodes ill for the prospects of reaching the target of 3% of GDP being 
spent on R&D. Albeit, this ratio is not directly comparable with the 3% target, as firm revenues is not 
the same as a firm’s contribution to GDP, but it is sufficiently close to the real numbers to allow the 
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deduction that a downward sloping trend in the ratio of R&D spending to firm revenue points to a 
downward sloping trend in firms’ contribution to R&D spending relative to GDP.  
Figure 27 shows the ratio of R&D spending relative to firm revenues subdivided into six industry 
classifications. The IT & Electronics industry ratio is based on a number of observations ranging from 
37 in 2001 to 298 in 2006; the Machinery industry ratio from 34 in 2002 to 65 in 2008; the Medical 
Devices industry from 5 in 2001 to 8 in 2006; the Pharmaceuticals industry from 8 in 2007 to 12 in 
2008; the Telecom industry from 10 in 2001 to 43 in 2008; and Other industries from 666 in 2002 to 
1103 in 2003. The extremely high ratio in 2001 for the Telecom industry may be caused by the low 
number of observations and specific firm or industry events, or it may be remnants of the dot com 
bubble. Whatever the reason, the ratio settled down and remained fairly stable at levels about half 
of the IT & Electronics, Machinery, and Pharmaceuticals industries. Figure 27 clearly shows that all 
the specific industries are much more R&D intensive than the Other industries category, with the 
Medical Devices industry as the industry with the highest R&D intensity and the IT & Electronics, 
Machinery, and Pharmaceuticals industries following closely behind. It certainly is a good argument 
for including these five industries as industry dummies in the regression analysis.  
 
 
Figure 22 – Total R&D per year, NOK 
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Figure 23 – Total venture capital for R&D per year, NOK 
 
 
Figure 24 – Ratio of venture capital to R&D per year, % 
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Figure 25 – venture capital spent on R&D relative to total venture capital 
 
 
Figure 26 – Ratio of R&D to revenues, % 
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Figure 27 – Ratio of R&D to revenues, % 
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11.0.0 Method of Analysis – Research Design 
 
The purpose of this empirical analysis is to attempt to confirm the hypothesis that firms receiving 
venture capital for R&D tend to also receive other forms of financing for R&D, i.e. if there is a causal 
relationship between receiving venture capital and receiving other forms of financing. One possible 
rationale for such a relationship is that venture capital funds’ approval of a firm acts as a strong 
signal to other financial intermediaries about the prospects of a firm; venture capital funds scrutinize 
their candidate firms before selecting them, and subsequently spend a lot of resources on 
monitoring as well as on providing managerial expertise to their portfolio firms, no other types of 
financial intermediaries are as thorough as venture capital funds. Another rationale is that by 
providing managerial expertise, venture capital funds also provide their portfolio firms with access to 
professional networks, including networks to other financial intermediaries, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of being approved for support by other financial intermediaries.   
Two types of empirical analyses will be applied in this study; the first part will attempt to explain 
empirically what characteristics are typical for firms receiving venture capital by applying a probit 
regression analysis, and the second part will attempt to explain empirically the relationship between 
venture capital financing and other types of external financing in relation to R&D spending, or, more 
specifically, attempt to identify the additionality effect of venture capital on total R&D.  
11.1.0 Probit Regression 
In order to explain empirically what characteristics are typical for firms receiving venture capital, it is 
useful to apply a Probit regression analysis. The Probit analysis is based on a binomial dependent 
variable, which is given a value of one if a firm receives venture capital and a value of zero if a firm 
does not receive venture capital, and a vector of independent variables, which are assumed to 
influence the outcome of the dependent variable. After estimating the marginal effects, we are left 
with a model that tells us how much a one unit change in each independent variable increases the 
probability of the dependent variable being one, i.e. that the firm receives venture capital. The 
marginal effect that will be estimated is the average marginal effect, that is, the average of the 
marginal effects computed at each individual in the sample. The alternative would be to estimate the 
marginal effect for an average observation, that is, the marginal effect computed at the sample 
mean. “Increasingly, current practice is moving to looking at the distribution of the marginal effects 
computed for each individual in the sample” (Baum 2006).  
The following independent variables were controlled for in the probit regression analysis; whether or 
not the firm previously received venture capital (variable 1 in table 5); growth in firm revenues 
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(variable 2 in table 5); growth in R&D financing (variable 3 in table 5); whether the firm performs IT 
related R&D (variable 4 in table 5), biotech related R&D (variable 5 in table 5), or materials related 
R&D (variable 6 in table 5); whether the firm performs product related R&D (variable 7 in table 5) or 
process related R&D (variable 8 in table 5); whether the firm belongs to the group with a high ratio of 
development efforts as opposed to basic or applied research (variable 9 in table 5); whether the firm 
belongs to the group with high R&D intensity (variable 10 in table 5); whether the firm belongs to the 
group with advanced R&D (variable 11 in table 5); whether the firm is involved in R&D cooperation 
projects (variable 12 in table 5); whether the firm is buying external R&D services (variable 13 in table 
5); whether the firm belongs to the size for those with average revenues below the 20th percentile 
(variable 14 in table 5); between the 20th and 40th percentiles (variable 15 in table 5), between the 
40th and 60th percentiles (see variable 16 in table 5), between the 60th and 80th percentiles (variable 
17 in table 5), or above the 80th percentile (variable 18 in table 5).  
11.2.0 FE Regression 
The method chosen to identify the additionality effect of venture capital on total R&D is multiple 
regression analysis adjusted for fixed effects, a Fixed Effects (FE) regression analysis. First I will 
explain the concept of additionality, and then the concept of the FE regression framework.  
A situation with no additionality and no crowding out effect in this study would be if one dollar of 
venture capital received and spent on R&D leads to a one dollar increase in total R&D. Full crowding 
out would be if the venture capital simply replaces other types of R&D financing, so that one dollar of 
venture capital received and spent on R&D results in exactly a zero increase in total R&D. Hence, 
some crowding out would be if one dollar of venture capital spent on R&D leads to less than a one 
dollar increase in total R&D. Positive additionality would be if the venture capital is matched with an 
increase in other types of R&D financing, so that one dollar of venture capital leads to more than a 
one dollar increase in total R&D (Klette & Møen 2011).  
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to identify the additionality effect of venture capital on total 
R&D, i.e. the causal effect of venture capital. This requires the identification of the counterfactual, 
i.e. what would have happened in the absence of the venture capital infusion. Predicting with perfect 
clarity what would have happened to a firm receiving venture capital if it had not received venture 
capital in the first place is quite challenging. The recipients of venture capital are a carefully selected 
group, so finding a control group of similar firms that have not received venture capital is difficult, 
but it would go a long way towards allowing the identification of the counterfactual. The FE 
regression framework is one way of getting closer to a counterfactual, and the sample used for the 
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regression analyses was also limited to firms that have received venture capital at some point in 
time, which should account for most of the selection effects making a causal study possible.  
An FE regression analysis is different from an OLS regression analysis in that it allows different 
constant terms (intercepts) for different groups, but the slope (i.e. the beta coefficients) of the 
regression lines must be equal across groups. What this means in practical term is that every firm is 
compared to its own average over time, so that the FE test with respect to the venture capital 
coefficient answers the question by how much do the firms increase their total R&D spending when 
they receive more venture capital than they do on average. Hence, the selection effect related to 
firm specificities that are constant over time is accounted for.  
Hence, unlike the OLS regression analysis, the FE regression analysis produces one regression line for 
each group instead of one regression line for all observations combined. The practical implication of 
this is that the FE framework allows there to be an unobserved individual specific effect in the error 
term which is correlated with the independent variables without resulting in biased estimates of 
coefficients, as long as the effect is constant, i.e. time invariant. Such individual effects could be 
differences in managerial effectiveness, firm productivity, quality of R&D personnel, better networks 
to venture capital funds, etc. By adjusting for such individual effects, much of the selection effect 
inherent in firms that are selected to receive venture capital should be accounted for, thus, making 
the control group better suited to identify the counterfactual.  
With respect to control variables, I will draw on the framework and reasoning of Klette & Møen in 
their 2011 paper, where they draw on Swenson (1992). Current revenues are used as a proxy for 
expected revenues to control for the possibility that expected revenues are important if 
development costs of new products or processes are fixed. The square of revenues is included to 
account for possible non-linearity in size. Time dummies and firm specific fixed effects are included 
to control for technological opportunities and the degree of appropriability. Industry dummies are 
included to control for the fact that some industries are more R&D intensive than others, although 
the industry dummies are disregarded with the FE regression analyses as the FE method requires at 
least two observations with at least some variation of each independent variable. And lastly, an 
independent variable for public subsidy is included as a consequence of Hægeland and Møen’s 2007 
study where they identified an additionality effect from public subsidies on R&D spending.  
The specification described above may not control for all variables that influence the outcome of the 
dependent variable, which means that some influencing effects may remain in the error term 
potentially leading to biased coefficients. It is not, however, possible to ever be certain about this, 
and, in any case, the potential bias may go in either direction.  
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Furthermore, to open up to the possibility that the functional form of the relationship between 
venture capital and total R&D spending is not linear, but rather log-linear, both functional forms are 
tested. If the signs of the coefficients are the same and significance levels are more or less the same, 
then the results of the regression analyses based on a linear functional form are considered to be 
robust with regards to functional form.  
In order to test the appropriateness of the assumptions of the FE regression framework in this study, 
First Differencing (FD) regression analyses were also performed. If the error term is not serially 
correlated the FE method is most efficient, but if the error term follows a random walk the FD 
method is most efficient, i.e. the higher the positive serial correlation the stronger is the case for 
using the FD method over the FE method.  Differences between the two methods in their results can 
also signal endogeneity problems as they deal with contemporaneous correlation differently.  
11.1.0 Potential Threats to the Validity of the Study 
11.1.1 Internal Validity 
Definition of internal validity: “Extent to which findings can be attributed to interventions rather than 
any flaws in your research design“ (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009).  
“Internal Validity is the approximate truth about inferences regarding cause-effect or causal 
relationships. Thus, internal validity is only relevant in studies that try to establish a causal 
relationship. It's not relevant in most observational or descriptive studies, for instance” (Trochim 
2006). As this study falls under the category of descriptive studies, and does not seek to find a causal 
relationship, internal validity is not a concern.  
11.1.2 External Validity 
Definition of external validity: “The extent to which the research results from a particular study are 
generalizable to all relevant contexts“ (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009).  
Another definition of external validity: “…external validity is the degree to which the conclusions in 
your study would hold for other persons in other places and at other times” (Trochim 2006).  
This study is based on Statistics Norway’s R&D surveys from 2001 to 2008, which covers all 
Norwegian firms above 50 employees, and a selection of the smaller firms. It stands to reason that 
the results of analyses on this sample would at least be generalizable to Norway as a whole, and 
probably to any sufficiently similar country. Of course, if something structural changes in the 
business environment, for example R&D tax credits are drastically increased or eliminated it may 
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change the relationship between venture capital and R&D spending, making generalizations across 
time a potentially dangerous exercise.  
11.1.3 Construct Validity 
Definition of Construct Validity: “Extent to which your measurement questions actually measure the 
presence of those constructs you intended them to measure” (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009). 
Most of the questions in Statistics Norway’s R&D survey are objective and appeared, by first glance, 
to be fairly straight forward to answer by the respondents. The central variable being examined in 
this study was the variable concerning venture capital spent on R&D. The precise question was: 
“State the financing for internal R&D expenses…”, which was then subdivided into several categories 
of financing sources where the central one for this study was “Own funds (income, new equity)” 
followed by “how much of this was Venture capital?” (author’s translation). A straight forward and 
simple question to answer, perhaps not. The measurement question was intended to measure how 
much of the internal R&D expenses were financed by venture capital. Let us consider what happens 
to the venture capital when the firm manages to raise it, presumably from venture capital funds. 
Venture capital funds’ motivation for providing a firm with venture capital is to gain an ownership 
stake in the firm for a share of the firm’s future profits, it is not to provide funds targeted for R&D, at 
least not directly. The venture capital then goes into the pool of equity, which includes at least one, 
possibly several, other forms of equity. When the firm later spends its equity on R&D efforts, it is a 
judgement call how much comes from venture capital and how much comes from other types of 
equity. One possible answer is that the R&D financing stemming from equity comes from all types of 
equity proportional to their share of total equity. Another is that the R&D spending was raised dollar 
for dollar by the infusion of venture capital into the firm so that all venture capital raised went to 
finance R&D. A third possibility is somewhere in between the two first. However, knowing that 
venture capitalists don’t like financing R&D but prefer investing in firms that are concluding their 
R&D efforts and getting ready to commercialize the product of their R&D efforts, a fourth possibility 
is that none of the venture capital went to finance the R&D efforts. These are all valid possibilities, 
and respondents may make a conscious judgement call on which explanation they prefer, or they 
may choose one without thinking about it. Either way, the question leaves room for interpretation, 
probably leading to considerable noise in the data, and the construct validity must be considered 
weak at best.  
11.1.4 Statistical Conclusion Validity 
Definition of Statistical Conclusion Validity: “Conclusion validity is the degree to which conclusions 
we reach about relationships in our data are reasonable” (Trochim 2006). There are two types of 
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errors one can make in conclusions; (type 1) incorrectly conclude that there is a relationship when 
there is none; (type 2) incorrectly conclude that there is no relationship when there is one.  
There are 5 threats to statistical conclusion validity: (1) Low reliability of measures, (2) Random 
heterogeneity of respondents, (3) Low statistical power, (4) Fishing and the error rate problem, and 
(5) Violated assumptions of statistical tests (Trochim 2006). (1), (2), and (3) are related to making a 
type 2 error, (4) is related to making a type 1 error, while (5) can lead to both types of errors and it is 
often not possible to predict what type of error is likely to be made.  
(1) Reliability: “The extent to which data collection technique or techniques will yield consistent 
findings, similar observations would be made or conclusions reached by other researchers or there is 
transparency in how sense was made from the raw data” (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009). There 
are four threats to reliability: (1a) participant error, (1b) participant bias, (1c) observer error, and (1d) 
observer bias (ibid).  
(1a) One source of threat to reliability is participant error. The participants in the SSB R&D survey are 
firms, but there are individual persons in the firms that have to answer the questionnaire on behalf 
of the firm. In the questionnaire from SSB, respondents might understand the questions differently, 
misinterpret the questions, or their responses might be influenced by their mood for example by the 
weather or by which day of the week they answer the questionnaire. That would reduce the 
reliability of their answers; this is known as participant error. In the SSB survey, the questions are 
mostly based on the firm’s accounts, the number of various types of employees, the types of R&D, 
and only a few questions are of a more subjective type for the consideration of the respondent. 
Some of the quantitative questions, however, are a little more complex than just looking them up in 
the firm’s accounts, and may require some estimations; therefore the problem of participant error, 
as a threat to the survey’s reliability, could potentially create some noise in the dataset, but it should 
not be particularly severe.  
(1b) Participant bias is another threat to reliability, but one that is probably not very relevant in 
relation to SSB’s R&D survey. Participant bias is when the respondents, for example, say what their 
bosses wants them to say, or what they think their bosses wants them to say, or if the respondent 
thinks it might affect their job security they might respond differently than if they had no such 
concerns. As mentioned earlier, only a few questions from the SSB R&D survey are of a more 
subjective type, and the problem of participant bias should, thus, be minimal.  
(1c) A third threat to reliability is observer error. Just like participants can misinterpret, make errors 
in judgement, or simply mistype, observers can, likewise, make mistakes that will increase the noise 
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in the data and reduce the reliability of the survey. An example of observer error in relation to 
questionnaires is if different firms received different questionnaires with slightly different framing or 
wording of the questions, which could potentially influence the responses from the firms. In SSB’s 
R&D survey, they send a large questionnaire to the large firms in their sample and a small 
questionnaire, with fewer questions, to the small firms in their sample, but the questions themselves 
are exactly the same and should not be a source of observer error. Another example is when the 
observer is manually typing the responses into a computer and simply mistypes. The problem of 
observer error from mistyping could potentially create some additional noise to the data, but that 
problem should be very small.  
(1d) The fourth and last threat to reliability is observer bias, which arises when there are several 
ways of interpreting the responses. In this case, the questionnaire is designed in such a way that 
nothing is left up to the observer to interpret; in those questions where judgement and estimations 
are necessary, the respondent is asked to make those decisions. Therefore, the threat of observer 
bias should not be present in this survey.  
(2) Random heterogeneity of respondents: “If you have a very diverse group of respondents, they are 
likely to vary more widely on your measures or observations. Some of their variety may be related to 
the phenomenon you are looking at, but at least part of it is likely to just constitute individual 
differences that are irrelevant to the relationship being observed” (Trochim 2006). The sample of 
firms from the R&D survey is very broad, and goes so far as to include all firms with 50 employees 
and more, and will, thus, suffer from precisely the disadvantage described by Trochim (2006). On the 
other hand, if a pattern emerges from a highly diverse sample, it is likely going to be strong and 
particularly interesting.  
(3) All of these threats (1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, and 2) are related to the noise in the data which can 
potentially mask a relationship between variables, and lead a researcher to make a type 2 error. 
There is one other factor that can also lead to a type 2 error, the strength of the signal, i.e. the true 
strength of the relationship being studied. “There is one broad threat to conclusion validity that 
tends to subsume or encompass all of the noise-producing factors above and also takes into account 
the strength of the signal, the amount of information you collect, and the amount of risk you're 
willing to take in making a decision about whether a relationship exists. This threat is called low 
statistical power” (Trochim 2006). Any statistical test relies on four basic components; (i) sample size, 
(ii) effect size or treatment effect, (iii) significance level, and (iv) statistical power (ibid). (i) Sample 
size is the number of units or observations in the data. (ii) Effect size is the effect of the treatment 
relative to the noise in the data. (iii) Significance level is the probability that the observed result is 
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purely due to chance. (iv) Statistical power is the probability that a test will reveal a treatment effect 
when it occurs. By knowing three of these components, it is possible to compute the fourth. 
Increasing or decreasing the value of one of the components can be reached by manipulating one or 
more of the other three components, or conversely, changing the value of one of the components 
will affect one or more of the other components. Note, however, that there is an inverse relationship 
between the significance level and the statistical power, so if the other two components are fixed, 
increasing the significance level also entails lowering the statistical power. Increasing the statistical 
power can be achieved by increasing sample size, increasing effect size, decreasing sample variability, 
increasing precision of measurement, decreasing significance level (increase α), or using more 
powerful statistical tests (University of Turin 2010).  
In this empirical test the data is derived from the SSB R&D survey, and so the sample size is limited 
upwards by the number of respondents from the survey, the effect size is fixed, the precision of 
measurement is fixed, and the most appropriate statistical tests are believed to have already been 
chosen. Increasing the statistical power can, thus, be achieved by decreasing the significance level, 
which at the same time increases the probability of making a type 1 error, or by decreasing sample 
variability. In order to decrease sample variability one can carefully select a control group that is as 
similar to the test group as possible without receiving treatment, use a repeated measures design 
(which is precisely what a longitudinal study is), and control for confounding factors (confounding 
factors will be discussed in greater detail in relation to threat number 5) (University of Turin 2010).  
(4) The first three threats to statistical conclusion validity (1, 2, and 3) are related to making a type 2 
error, while (4) is related to making a type 1 error. Most researchers will be more susceptible to 
making a type 1 error; if researchers find a relationship, they will most often be confident in their 
findings, but if researchers find no relationship, they will spend considerable time analyzing why they 
did not find a relationship and attempt to make adjustments in order to find the relationship they 
were looking for. This can lead to fishing: “fishing for a specific result by analyzing the data 
repeatedly under slightly differing conditions or assumptions” (Trochim 2006). Many researchers use 
the 5% significance level to determine if a relationship exists or not, which means that there is a 5% 
probability of finding a relationship by chance when there is none, or conversely, you would expect 
to find a relationship in one out of 20 statistical tests on the same data when there is no true 
relationship. If it is reasonable to assume that each test on the same data is sufficiently similar, and 
therefore not independent of each other, then the significance level should be adjusted to reflect the 
number of analyses performed; “The probability assumption that underlies most statistical analyses 
assumes that each analysis is independent of the other. But that may not be true when you conduct 
multiple analyses of the same data” (ibid). The statistical tests in this paper were only performed 
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once with one setup, and the problem of fishing is not relevant. That does not, however, eliminate 
the possibility of making a type 1 error by pure chance.  
(5) Violated assumptions of statistical tests is perhaps the most complicated and comprehensive 
threat to statistical conclusion validity. Violated statistical assumptions enable researchers with 
competing alternative hypotheses to write articles where they criticize, and sometimes outright 
vilify, the methodology and assumptions of the other researcher in an attempt to reinforce his/hers 
own findings. What is more is that academics are usually required to publish a certain number of 
articles per year, and it is often easier to write an article berating another article and get published 
than it is to get published based on new research. This “battle” over research findings has the upside 
of creating important debates and drawing in other researchers to look at the same problems, thus 
enhancing the effort of finding the best answers to research questions, and it stands to reason that it 
would make researchers meticulous with their methodology and empirical analyses out of fear of 
being ridiculed by opposing researchers.  
In relation to the tests being applied in this study, there are 4 potential threats to the statistical 
conclusion validity stemming from violated assumptions of the statistical tests.  
(5a) “Fixed effect estimators allow for correlation between the explanatory variables and the 
unobserved individual specific effect. But, if there is no variation over time in one of the explanatory 
variables (for instance, a wage-equation where education is one of the explanatory variables) the 
effect of this non-time varying explanatory variable cannot be identified (you will not get an estimate 
if you try to estimate the model). The fixed effect estimators are also “consuming” degrees of 
freedom *…+ The random effect model cannot be used if there is correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the unobserved individual specific effect” (Lecture notes on panel data 
estimation in ECO402 at NHH, Fall 2010). How can they be correlated in this study? For example, the 
productivity of the firms is not completely captured by the independent variables, and, as a 
consequence, the error term will include these time independent, unobserved individual specific 
effects. The error term will, thus, be correlated with the independent (explanatory) variables. This is 
not a problem in a Fixed Effects model as long as the unobserved individual specific effects are time 
invariant, i.e. constant over time, however, if the unobserved individual specific effects are not time 
invariant there will still be a problem with the data, potentially leading to biased results.  
(5b) Many panel datasets concerning firms have missing years for at least some cross-sectional units 
in the sample, which then makes it an unbalanced panel. The fixed effects method with an 
unbalanced panel dataset is not much different from a balanced panel dataset, and Stata (the 
statistical software program used in this study) makes the necessary adjustments automatically. The 
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reason why the panel dataset is unbalanced, however, can create biased estimates. “If the reason a 
firm leaves the sample (called attrition) is correlated with the idiosyncratic error *…+ then the 
resulting sample section problem can cause biased estimators“ (Wooldridge 2009). How can the 
attrition in this dataset be correlated with the unobserved individual specific effect? As mentioned 
earlier, Statistics Norway include all major firms, but only a selection of small and medium sized 
firms. For example, if the reason a firm leaves the sample is bankruptcy, and the unobserved effect is 
related to productivity, and bankruptcy is clearly correlated with productivity, then the attrition is 
correlated with the unobserved individual specific effect. However, the fixed effects method allows 
attrition to be correlated with the unobserved individual specific effect, so we do not have to worry 
about attrition bias in this case. If, on the other hand, the attrition is correlated to some other factor, 
there might be a problem with the data.  
(5c) One can never be 100% confident that all relevant independent variables, i.e. those independent 
variables that influence the outcome of the dependent variable, have been controlled for in the 
model. If one or more relevant independent variables have not been controlled for, then the error 
term will include the effects from these independent variables. Incorrect inference can be made 
about the correlation between two variables due to confounding factors (also known as spurious 
correlation or a spurious regression problem); “Spurious Correlation: A correlation between two 
variables that is not due to causality, but perhaps to the dependence of the two variables on another 
unobserved factor *…+ Spurious Regression Problem: A problem that arises when regression analysis 
indicates a relationship between two or more unrelated time series processes simply because each 
has a trend, is an integrated time series (such as random walk), or both” (Wooldridge 2009). There is 
no way to test for confounding factors, so one must simply keep in mind that there may be relevant 
independent variables that have not been controlled for, which would lead to biased results.  
(5d) “In regression analysis using time series data, autocorrelation of the errors is a problem. 
Autocorrelation of the errors, which themselves are unobserved, can generally be detected because 
it produces autocorrelation in the observable residuals. (Errors are also known as "error terms", 
in econometrics.) Autocorrelation violates the ordinary least squares (OLS) assumption that the error 
terms are uncorrelated. While it does not bias the OLS coefficient estimates, the standard errors tend 
to be underestimated (and the t-scores overestimated) when the autocorrelations of the errors at 
low lags are positive.”11 The implication for this study is that even though there may be serial 
correlation present in the error term, the coefficients will be unbiased, and it will therefore not affect 
the conclusion of the results.  
                                                             
11
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autocorrelation 
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12.0.0 Results 
 
12.1.0 What Characterizes Firms Receiving Venture Capital 
A Probit regression analysis was applied to attempt to identify what factors or characteristics may 
explain why a firm receives venture capital. The coefficients of the independent variables, reported 
in table 5 along with their standard error and significance level, show the effect of the independent 
variables on the probability of receiving venture capital. It is natural to assume that firms that have 
received venture capital in the past (variable 1 in table 5) will be much more likely to receive venture 
capital as venture capital funds tend to provide venture capital in staged financing rounds. This 
variable may, however, “steal” much of the significance from other variables, so the Probit analysis 
was performed once without this variable (column E of table 5) and once with this variable (column F 
of table 5). As the figure shows, the results did not change all that much between (E) and (F). The 
most surprising part of the results is how few variables proved to be significantly different than zero, 
but that may be due to the weak construct validity of the venture capital variable described in 
chapter 11.1.3.  
Considering (E), table 5 shows that firms that receive venture capital more frequently belong to the 
high R&D intensity group (variable 10 in table 5), i.e. those firms with R&D intensity above the mean 
R&D intensity in the sample. Belonging to the high R&D intensity group has the effect of increasing 
the probability of receiving venture capital by about 5.3%, which is significant at the 5% significance 
level. Also, quite interestingly, firms belonging to the second smallest size group (variable 15 in table 
5) have about a 4.5% higher probability of receiving venture capital, which is significant at the 10% 
significance level. While firms belonging to the middle size group (variable 16 in table 5) have about a 
3.6% higher probability or receiving venture capital, which is significant at the 5% significance level. 
Other than those three factors, no significant relationships were found relating to the probability of 
receiving venture capital.  
Now considering (F), table 5 shows that firms that previously received venture capital have about an 
8% higher probability of receiving venture capital, which is significant at the 1% significance level. 
When controlling for the firms that have already received venture capital, the coefficients of the 
variables identified to be significant when considering (E) changed. Firms belonging to the high R&D 
intensity group (variable 10 in table 5) now have about a 4% higher probability of receiving venture 
capital, which is significant at the 5% significance level. Firms belonging to the second smallest size 
group (variable 15 in table 5) have about a 5% higher probability of receiving venture capital and 
firms belonging to the middle size group (variable 16 in table 5) have about a 3.8% higher probability 
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of receiving venture capital, both of which are significant at the 5% significance level. Again, no other 
variables were found to have a significant impact on the probability of receiving venture capital.  
 
 
Table 5 – Shows the results of the Probit regression analysis. The dependent variable is a dummy for receiving venture 
capital. (E) Probit analysis without variable 1; (F) Probit analysis with variable 1 (variable 1 controls for firms that have 
received venture capital in the past) 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
0.080388 ***
(0.030142)
-0.000014 -0.000020 
(0.000056) (0.000054)
-0.000006 0.000002
(0.000037) (0.000037)
0.006950 0.003116
(0.006779) (0.006622)
0.000591 -0.002616 
(0.012299) (0.010992)
-0.002380 -0.002422 
(0.007864) (0.007658)
0.010418 0.011814
(0.011095) (0.010407)
-0.009527 -0.006839 
(0.006926) (0.006680)
-0.007760 -0.005722 
(0.006701) (0.006725)
0.053126 ** 0.040017 **
(0.022889) (0.020193)
0.016405 0.017037
(0.013511) (0.013495)
-0.003103 -0.000764 
(0.006850) (0.006740)
-0.000035 0.000079
(0.006851) (0.006646)
0.043740 0.025752
(0.032043) (0.025643)
0.045265 * 0.049782 **
(0.023060) (0.024035)
0.036257 ** 0.037535 **
(0.016501) (0.016857)
0.009428 0.012043
(0.010862) (0.011198)
(omitted) (omitted)
Pseudo R-sq 0.1486 0.1870
# of obs 2167 2167
size_D1
18 size_D5
7
6
5
4
3
12
11
10
9
8
17
16
15
13
14
size_D3
size_D4
(F)(E)
FOU_intensitet_høy_D
FOU_avansert_D
sam_D
fouinnkj_D
size_D2
fouomr_biotech_D
fouomr_materialer_D
foukost_A_produkt_D
foukost_A_prosess_D
foukost_B_utvikling_høy_D
foufin_VC_før_D
firma_oms_vekst
foufin_tot_vekst
fouomr_IT_D
2
1
Probit regression
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12.2.0 Additionality of Venture Capital on Total R&D Financing 
An FE regression analysis was applied to attempt to identify the additionality of venture capital on 
total R&D spending, or in other words, to see if there is a tendency for firms receiving venture capital 
to also supplement total R&D spending from other financing sources. The results are reported in 
tables 6-17, with a summary of the coefficients for the venture capital variable and their significance 
levels from all the different regression analyses reported in table 18. Each table has five columns (G-
K) representing five different limitations on the sample being analyzed; (G) is limited to all firms with 
R&D at some point in time; (H) is limited to all firms with a minimum of two firm observations and 
firms that had financed R&D with venture capital at some point in time; (I) has the same limitations 
as H but also excludes all firms with average annual R&D expenditures of 40 million NOK or more, a 
total of five firms; (J) has the same limitations as (I) and, additionally, only includes the biggest half of 
the remaining firms in the sample based on their average annual R&D financing; (K) has the same 
limitations as (I) and, additionally, only includes the smallest half of the remaining firms in the sample 
based on their average annual R&D financing. The most interesting results are therefore found in (J) 
and (K), which is the analysis on only big firms and only small firms respectively. (H) Is the limitations 
that the Fixed Effects (FE) method and the First Differencing (FD) method do automatically, so only 
when performing an OLS regression will (G) have any results to report, which are then only 
comparable with other OLS regressions in the (G) column and not with FE or FD regressions.  
In tables 6-8 a dummy variable for whether or not the firm receives venture capital is used in 
combination with a linear functional form. In tables 9-11 the dummy variable is used in combination 
with a log-linear functional form. In tables 12-14 a linear functional form is applied in combination 
with the normal continuous venture capital variable. In tables 15-17 a log-linear functional form is 
applied in combination with the natural logarithm of venture capital.  
Table 6 reports OLS regression analyses with a dummy variable for venture capital as the 
independent variable for venture capital. The venture capital coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero in (G) or (H). (I) excludes only the five biggest firms from the sample relative to 
(H), but already you can see a huge difference in the venture capital coefficient. Suddenly the 
venture capital coefficient is twice as high and significant at the 1% significance level. Separating the 
sample of (I) into its biggest half of firms (J) and smallest half of firms (K) shows that the biggest half 
of firms spend about five times as much venture capital on R&D than do the smallest half of firms, 
and both venture capital coefficients are significant at the 1% significance level. Based on all of these 
findings it is evident that, based on the venture capital coefficients in (H), (I), (J), and (K), the biggest 
firms are driving the results, thereby validating the split in the sample between big firms and small 
firms presented in (J) and (K).  
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Table 6 – OLS regression analyses (venture capital dummy regressed on total R&D) 
 
The same pattern and conclusion found in table 6 is evident when considering the results presented 
in table 7 and table 8, where the FE and FD methods are applied respectively. 
 
Table 7 – FE regression analyses (venture capital dummy regressed on total R&D) 
 
 
Table 8 – FD regression analyses (venture capital dummy regressed on total R&D) 
 
Conditions:
472.0682 1091.9780 2102.1890 *** 2686.4170 *** 524.0579 ***
(1115.7080) (1020.8880) (642.0382) (1027.4710) (147.2049)
1.8340 *** 5.9166 *** 2.6781 *** 1.7790 *** 2.1243 ***
(0.0920) (1.7410) (0.4021) (0.4915) (0.2544)
0.0037 *** -0.0022 0.0052 *** 0.0059 ** 0.0016 ***
(0.0005) (0.0052) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0006)
-3.84E-12 *** 4.28E-09 *** -1.32E-09 ** -1.73E-09 ** -3.04E-10
(9.63E-13) (1.10E-09) (5.40E-10) (7.51E-10) (2.45E-10)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.4416 0.4305 0.2790 0.1920 0.4911
# of observations 11195 695 672 342 330
Firm revenues - sq
OLS regression: VC (dummy) on total R&D
(G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
VC (dummy)
Public funding
Firm revenues
Conditions:
914.3950 1286.7220 ** 1765.1170 * 634.9213 ***
(856.3999) (510.9637) (999.9215) (125.0554)
0.5871 1.1882 *** 1.1901 *** 1.9118 ***
(0.4965) (0.3086) (0.4601) (0.1727)
-0.0059 * 0.0041 0.0067 -0.0000 
(0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0050) (0.0010)
4.28E-09 *** -1.08E-09 * -1.54E-09 -1.33E-10
(4.82E-10) (6.26E-10) (1.03E-09) (3.74E-10)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.3887 0.0751 0.0855 0.4770
# of observations 695 672 342 330
# of firms (groups) 176 171 86 85
FE regression: VC (dummy) on total R&D
(G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
VC (dummy)
Public funding
Firm revenues
Firm revenues - sq
Conditions:
868.1434 * 1223.7210 *** 1547.4180 ** 582.8182 ***
(512.6836) (381.8834) (653.0941) (156.2483)
0.3371 -0.0442 -0.0832 1.7670 ***
(0.5583) (0.4678) (0.4553) (0.5051)
0.0051 0.0004 0.0002 0.0011
(0.0118) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0013)
3.34E-10 -3.01E-10 -3.04E-10 4.30E-11
(9.39E-10) (2.72E-10) (3.82E-10) (3.01E-10)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.0787 0.0382 0.0554 0.2988
# of observations 347 335 185 150
Public funding
Firm revenues
Firm revenues - sq
FD regression: VC (dummy) on total R&D
(G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
VC (dummy)
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Tables 9-12 show the results of using the venture capital dummy variable in combination with a log-
linear functional form. When comparing the results shown in these tables to the results discussed in 
relation to tables 6-8 it is apparent that, although the signs of the venture capital coefficients are the 
same, the significance levels are somewhat different. This may indicate that the true functional form 
is, in fact, log-linear.  
 
Table 9 – OLS regression analyses (venture capital dummy regressed on the logarithm of total R&D) 
 
 
Table 10 – FE regression analyses (venture capital dummy regressed on the logarithm of total R&D) 
 
 
Table 11 – FD regression analyses (venture capital dummy regressed on the logarithm of total R&D) 
Conditions:
1.5749 *** 1.5565 *** 1.6061 *** 0.9664 *** 2.1633 ***
(0.1296) (0.1770) (0.1799) (0.2101) (0.2518)
0.6330 *** 0.4846 *** 0.4604 *** 0.2673 *** 0.5137 ***
(0.0105) (0.0401) (0.0392) (0.0611) (0.0488)
(omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
8.08E-02 *** 8.88E-02 *** 7.13E-02 *** 3.35E-02 2.00E-01 ***
(0.0104) (0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0308) (0.0492)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.3245 0.3845 0.3704 0.2184 0.3726
# of observations 11195 695 672 342 330
OLS regression: foufin_VC_D on lnFOU_tot
(G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
VC (dummy)
ln(Public funding)
ln(Firm revenues)
ln(Firm revenues - sq)
Conditions:
1.5784 *** 1.6170 *** 0.8002 *** 2.4879 ***
(0.1980) (0.2040) (0.2711) (0.3043)
0.3529 *** 0.3564 *** 0.2920 *** 0.4209 ***
(0.0395) (0.0407) (0.0563) (0.0599)
(omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
6.74E-02 * 7.01E-02 * 5.80E-02 1.01E-01
(0.0366) (0.0373) (0.0419) (0.0755)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.2874 0.2939 0.1818 0.4448
# of observations 695 672 342 330
# of firms (groups) 176 171 86 85
(K)
VC (dummy)
ln(Public funding)
ln(Firm revenues)
ln(Firm revenues - sq)
FE regression: foufin_VC_D on lnFOU_tot
(G) (H) (I) (J)
Conditions:
1.1771 *** 1.2131 *** 0.6511 *** 1.9191 ***
(0.2114) (0.2180) (0.2436) (0.3722)
0.3618 *** 0.3635 *** 0.2618 *** 0.4548 ***
(0.0631) (0.0640) (0.0848) (0.0906)
(omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-1.46E-03 1.71E-03 -5.63E-03 2.16E-02
(0.0252) (0.0255) (0.0283) (0.0294)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.2601 0.2633 0.1972 0.3821
# of observations 347 335 185 150
VC (dummy)
ln(Public funding)
ln(Firm revenues)
ln(Firm revenues - sq)
FD regression: foufin_VC_D on lnFOU_tot
(G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
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Table 12 reports OLS regressions with a linear functional form. The venture capital coefficients show 
an additionality effect of 0.6789 for the sample consisting of all firms with venture capital at some 
point in time (H), 0.8049 for the sample without the five biggest firms (I), 0.7149 for the sample with 
the biggest half of the remaining sample (J), and 0.6258 for the smallest half of the remaining sample 
(K), and all of these venture capital coefficients are significant at the 1% significance level. First of all, 
the difference between the venture capital coefficients reported in (H) and (I) is startling considering 
that the only difference in their samples is the exclusion of the five biggest firms in terms of R&D 
spending in (I) relative to (H). Clearly there is a great deal of heteroscedasticity in the sample, and the 
big firms appear to be driving the results. The big firms will have a smaller influence on the results 
when a log-linear functional form is applied. Furthermore, the venture capital coefficients imply that 
for every krone of venture capital spent on R&D, total R&D increases by less than one krone, i.e. 
there is a crowding out effect where venture capital partly replaces some other forms of R&D 
financing. Furthermore, OLS regressions show that the crowding out effect is greater for the smallest 
half of the sample (K), resulting in a lower venture capital coefficient, than it is for the biggest half of 
the sample (J).  
However, by studying the results more closely one can discover that something is not quite right with 
the OLS regression results in table 12. The OLS method assumes and forces one common constant 
term for every firm in its sample. If the “true” constant terms of the two groups in (J) and (K) are 
equal and the smallest group has a greater crowding out effect, resulting in a lower venture capital 
coefficient, then their combined venture capital coefficient reported in (I) should have been in 
between the venture capital coefficients reported in (J) and (K). This is not the case, however, and, in 
fact, the constant terms in the OLS regression analyses for the two groups reported in (J) and (K) 
differ widely. This is a strong indication that the FE method would be more appropriate, as it allows 
every firm in the sample to have its own constant term.  
 
Table 12 – OLS regression analyses (venture capital regressed on total R&D) 
 
Conditions:
0.6264 *** 0.6789 *** 0.8049 *** 0.7149 *** 0.6258 ***
(0.2210) (0.1050) (0.0863) (0.0976) (0.0832)
1.8331 *** 5.2372 *** 2.3125 *** 1.6728 *** 2.0690 ***
(0.0912) (1.8343) (0.3775) (0.4933) (0.2337)
0.0037 *** -0.0019 0.0061 *** 0.0074 *** 0.0016 ***
(0.0005) (0.0049) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0005)
-3.85E-12 *** 4.22E-09 *** -1.56E-09 *** -2.04E-09 *** -3.54E-10
(9.63E-13) (1.17E-09) (5.39E-10) (7.64E-10) (2.17E-10)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.4421 0.4668 0.4083 0.3160 0.5516
# of observations 11195 695 672 342 330
VC
Public funding
Firm revenues
Firm revenues - sq
OLS regression: VC on total R&D
(G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
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Table 13 reports the results of the FE regressions with a linear functional form. The venture capital 
coefficients show an additionality effect of 0.2312 for the sample consisting of all firms with venture 
capital at some point in time (H), 0.4731 for the sample without the five biggest firms (I), 0.4635 for 
the sample with the biggest half of the remaining sample (J), and 0.6557 for the smallest half of the 
remaining sample (K), and all of these venture capital coefficients are significant at the 1% 
significance level, except for the venture capital coefficient in (H), which is significant at the 5% 
significance level. The conclusion about heterogeneity from the previous paragraph remains robust. 
Furthermore, the results, once again, show a partial crowding out effect of venture capital on total 
R&D financing, and the crowding out effect is even greater under the FE assumptions compared to 
that of the OLS assumptions, resulting in lower venture capital coefficients. This is consistent with the 
measurement error effect described in chapter 10.0.0, and it also indicates a positive selection effect 
with respect to receiving venture capital. The difference between the biggest half of the sample (J) 
and the smallest half of the sample (K), however, is opposite of that reported in the OLS regression 
analyses; the crowding out effect is greater for the biggest half of the sample (J), resulting in a lower 
venture capital coefficient. This last result may be more appealing, though, because bigger firms are 
probably less capital constraint, and therefore have less of a need to supplement the R&D spending 
with venture capital.  
 
Table 13 – FE regression analyses (venture capital on total R&D) 
 
Table 14 reports the results of the FD regressions with a linear functional form. The purpose of 
performing the FD regressions is to verify the robustness of the FE assumptions. Without going into 
more detail, both the sign of the venture capital coefficients and their significance levels are quite 
similar, inspiring confidence in the appropriateness of the FE method.  
Conditions:
0.2312 ** 0.4731 *** 0.4635 *** 0.6557 ***
(0.1036) (0.0702) (0.0990) (0.0841)
0.7079 1.3192 *** 1.3004 *** 1.8814 ***
(0.4952) (0.2958) (0.4430) (0.1597)
-0.0058 * 0.0042 0.0067 -0.0001 
(0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0048) (0.0009)
4.31E-09 *** -1.10E-09 * -1.55E-09 -6.36E-11
(4.80E-10) (6.03E-10) (9.89E-10) (3.51E-10)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.3933 0.1429 0.1505 0.5394
# of observations 695 672 342 330
# of firms (groups) 176 171 86 85
FE regression: VC on total R&D
(G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
VC
Public funding
Firm revenues
Firm revenues - sq
107 
 
 
Table 14 – FD regression analyses (venture capital regressed on total R&D) 
 
Table 16 shows the results of the FE regressions with a log-linear functional form. The purpose of 
analyzing both a linear functional form and a log-linear functional form is to verify the results in case 
the true relationship between venture capital and total R&D is not a linear relationship but rather a 
log-linear relationship. Applying regression analyses with a log-linear functional form also has the 
added benefit of reducing the problem of heteroscedasticity. If venture capital coefficients of the 
same sign and with similar significance levels are found for a log-linear functional form as for a linear 
functional form, then the results are considered to be robust in relation to the functional form. 
Without going into more detail, both the sign of the venture capital coefficients and the significance 
levels are quite similar, inspiring confidence in the venture capital coefficients and significance levels 
reported in table 13.  
 
Table 15 – OLS regression analyses (the logarithm of venture capital regressed on the logarithm of total R&D) 
 
 
 
Conditions:
0.1594 0.5079 *** 0.5053 *** 0.5633 ***
(0.1891) (0.1384) (0.1388) (0.1155)
0.3964 -0.0389 -0.0832 1.7930 ***
(0.5569) (0.4498) (0.4473) (0.4806)
0.0054 -0.0009 -0.0017 0.0012
(0.0119) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0012)
3.07E-10 -7.16E-11 -9.36E-13 5.85E-11
(9.56E-10) (2.95E-10) (3.92E-10) (2.77E-10)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.0861 0.2113 0.2284 0.3885
# of observations 347 335 185 150
VC
Public funding
Firm revenues
Firm revenues - sq
FD regression: VC on total R&D
(G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
Conditions:
0.2090 *** 0.2146 *** 0.2212 *** 0.1248 *** 0.3403 ***
(0.0177) (0.0241) (0.0248) (0.0256) (0.0376)
0.6323 *** 0.4783 *** 0.4549 *** 0.2643 *** 0.5188 ***
(0.0105) (0.0399) (0.0391) (0.0612) (0.0492)
(omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
0.0812           *** 0.0948           *** 0.0779         *** 0.0365           0.2061         ***
(0.0104) (0.0274) (0.0276) (0.0310) (0.0477)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.3244 0.3892 0.3742 0.2225 0.3786
# of observations 11195 695 672 342 330
OLS regression: ln(VC) on ln(total R&D)
(G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
ln(VC)
ln(Public funding)
ln(Firm revenues)
ln(Firm revenues - sq)
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The same conclusions that were drawn when comparing table 16 with table 13 are also evident when 
comparing tables 12 and 14 with tables 15 and 17 respectively.  
 
Table 16 – FE regression analyses (the logarithm of venture capital regressed on the logarithm of total R&D) 
 
 
Table 17 – FD regression analyses (the logarithm of venture capital regressed on the logarithm of total R&D) 
 
The conclusion of all of these regression analyses is that there appears to be a crowding out effect 
from venture capital on total R&D financing, so that every krone of venture capital spent on R&D 
increases total R&D by less than one krone, which is not what the hypothesis going into the study 
was. The results show that the additionality effect is 0.6557 for smaller firms and 0.4635 for bigger 
firms. Hence, the crowding out effect appears to be greater for bigger firms than for smaller firms, 
implying that venture capital may be more important as a way to finance R&D for small firms than it 
is for big firms and that small firms are more capital constraint.  
Another interesting result which has not been mentioned due to it not being central to this study is 
that the coefficients for public funding clearly and fairly consistently point to a positive additionality 
effect on total R&D financing, although there appears to be great differences between smaller and 
Conditions:
0.1959 *** 0.2044 *** 0.1033 *** 0.3793 ***
(0.0273) (0.0284) (0.0341) (0.0473)
0.3631 *** 0.3652 *** 0.2890 *** 0.4334 ***
(0.0398) (0.0412) (0.0564) (0.0598)
(omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
0.0715           * 0.0750         ** 0.0603           0.1015         
(0.0369) (0.0376) (0.0419) (0.0758)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.2722 0.2796 0.1832 0.4400
# of observations 695 672 342 330
# of firms (groups) 176 171 86 85
FE regression: ln(VC) on ln(total R&D)
(G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
ln(VC)
ln(Public funding)
ln(Firm revenues)
ln(Firm revenues - sq)
Conditions:
0.1421 *** 0.1508 *** 0.0854 ** 0.2827 ***
(0.0298) (0.0313) (0.0343) (0.0567)
0.3670 *** 0.3675 *** 0.2561 *** 0.4682 ***
(0.0649) (0.0656) (0.0843) (0.0902)
(omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
0.0008           0.0050         -0.0030          0.0177         
(0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0277) (0.0276)
Adj. R-sq (within) 0.2456 0.2505 0.1986 0.3778
# of observations 347 335 185 150
ln(VC)
ln(Public funding)
ln(Firm revenues)
ln(Firm revenues - sq)
FD regression: ln(VC) on ln(total R&D)
(G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
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bigger firms as reported in columns (J) and (K) in the tables. This simply confirms the findings of 
Klette & Møen in their 2011 study on the additionality effects of R&D subsidies on total R&D 
spending.  
 
 
Table 18 - Shows the venture capital coefficients and their significance levels from tables 6-17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
472.0682 1091.9780 2102.1890 *** 2686.4170 *** 524.0579 ***
914.3950 1286.7220 ** 1765.1170 * 634.9213 ***
868.1434 * 1223.7210 *** 1547.4180 ** 582.8182 ***
1.5749 *** 1.5565 *** 1.6061 *** 0.9664 *** 2.1633 ***
1.5784 *** 1.6170 *** 0.8002 *** 2.4879 ***
1.1771 *** 1.2131 *** 0.6511 *** 1.9191 ***
0.6264 *** 0.6789 *** 0.8049 *** 0.7149 *** 0.6258 ***
0.2312 ** 0.4731 *** 0.4635 *** 0.6557 ***
0.1594 0.5079 *** 0.5053 *** 0.5633 ***
0.2090 *** 0.2146 *** 0.2212 *** 0.1248 *** 0.3403 ***
0.1959 *** 0.2044 *** 0.1033 *** 0.3793 ***
0.1421 *** 0.1508 *** 0.0854 ** 0.2827 ***
OLS regression: VC (dummy) on ln(total R&D)
FE regression: VC (dummy) on ln(total R&D)
FD regression: VC (dummy) on ln(total R&D)
(K)(J)(I)(H)Summary table (G)
FD regression: ln(VC) on ln(total R&D)
FE regression: ln(VC) on ln(total R&D)
OLS regression: ln(VC) on ln(total R&D)
FD regression: VC on total R&D
FE regression: VC on total R&D
OLS regression: VC on total R&D
FD regression: VC (dummy) on total R&D
FE regression: VC (dummy) on total R&D
OLS regression: VC (dummy) on total R&D
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13.0.0 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper is to identify what characterizes firms receiving venture capital, and what 
the additionality effect of venture capital is on total R&D financing. The hypothesis was that firms 
receiving venture capital have a tendency to also receive other forms of financing for R&D. Some 
rationales for why such a relationship might exist was described.   
Tests of difference between venture capital firms and non-venture capital firms for a long range of 
variables showed the following results: venture capital firms tend to belong to the IT, Machinery, 
Telecom, Pharmaceuticals, and biotech industries; they tend to be somewhat smaller, but grow 
faster than non-venture capital firms; they tend to be more export oriented; they tend to receive 
public financing more often, but the evidence of venture capital firms receiving more public financing 
was weak; they tend to have a far higher R&D intensity; they tend to have a higher ratio of R&D 
personnel with PhDs and other higher educational backgrounds, and they tend to perform more 
advanced R&D; they tend to be involved in R&D cooperation with outsiders more often; they tend to 
have a slightly higher frequency of product related R&D as opposed to process related R&D, and they 
tend to have a slightly higher frequency of basic and applied research as opposed to development; 
they tend much more frequently to have introduced new or improved products, and slightly less 
frequently to have introduced new or improved processes compared to non-venture capital firms; 
they respond much more frequently to have experienced obstructions to their innovation efforts, 
particularly financial obstructions; and venture capital firms tend to use patenting, trademark 
protection, and secrecy to protect their innovations more frequently, but design complexity to 
protect their innovations less frequently than do non-venture capital firms.  
Tests of difference between venture capital firms after receiving venture capital and venture capital 
firms prior to receiving venture capital showed the following results: venture capital firms after 
receiving venture capital tend to grow much faster than venture capital firms prior to receiving 
venture capital; they tend to have a much higher R&D intensity; they tend more frequently to have 
product related R&D and less frequently to have process related R&D, and they tend to invest a 
higher ratio of their total R&D expenses in product related R&D; they tend more frequently to have 
introduced new or improved products; and venture capital firms after receiving venture capital tend 
more frequently to respond that they have experienced obstructions to their innovation efforts than 
do venture capital firms prior to receiving venture capital.  
Such tests of difference are very crude and cannot take into account trends in the variables, which 
potentially has the unfortunate effect of leading to biased coefficients and exaggerated significance 
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levels. Therefore, a Probit regression analysis was also performed to identify what factors increased 
the probability of receiving venture capital. The results of the Probit regression analysis showed that 
firms that previously received venture capital have about an 8% higher probability of receiving 
venture capital; firms with high R&D intensity have about a 4% higher probability of receiving 
venture capital; firms belonging to the second smallest size group have about a 5% higher probability 
of receiving venture capital; and firms belonging to the middle size group have about a 3.8% higher 
probability of receiving venture capital. No other variables were found to have a significant impact on 
the probability of receiving venture capital.  
In order to identify the additionality effect of venture capital on total R&D financing the Fixed Effects 
(FE) regression method was applied. The results showed that there appears to be a crowding out 
effect from venture capital on total R&D financing, meaning that every krone of venture capital spent 
on R&D increases total R&D by less than one krone. The implication is that the decision makers tend 
to use venture capital to finance R&D and at the same time reduce the amount of R&D financing 
from other financing sources. Furthermore, this crowding out effect appears to be greater for bigger 
firms than for smaller firms, implying that venture capital may be more important as a way to finance 
R&D for small firms than it is for big firms and that small firms are more capital constraint. The 
results remained robust when applying an FD regression method, which indicated the 
appropriateness of using the FE regression method, as well as to changes in the functional form used 
in the model specification.  
One very important insight was discovered when analyzing the potential threats to the validity of the 
results; the construct validity was found to be weak. The weakness lies in the survey question 
regarding venture capital in the R&D survey from Statistics Norway, which was found to be an 
inadequate way of measuring the amount of venture capital spent on R&D. The big elephant in the 
room is related to whether it is even possible to make an objective distinction between what sources 
of firm equity can be considered to have financed R&D efforts. Four different ways of making such a 
distinction was identified, and which is more correct is debatable. We can, therefore, assume that 
the survey respondents may have answered the question on venture capital in different ways.  
The measurement errors related to the weak construct validity would bias the coefficients towards 
zero, meaning that the estimated coefficients are conservative estimates. However, there may be 
other relevant variables that have not been accounted for that could potentially pull the coefficients 
in the positive direction, and it is difficult to say what the net results would be. The results of this 
study should, therefore, be used with caution.  
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